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Language leads us to a thought which is no 
longer ours alone, to a thought which is presump­
tively universal, though this is never the universal­
ity of a pure concept which would be identical for 
every mind. . . . Communication in literature is 
not the simple appeal on the part of the writer to 
meanings which would be part of an a priori of the 
mind; rather communication arouses these meanings 
in the mind through enticement and a kind of oblique 
action. The writer's thought does not control his 
language from without; the writer is himself a kind 
of new idiom, constructing itself, inventing ways 
of expression, and diversifying itself according to 
its own meaning.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
The Primacy of Perception
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INTRODUCTION
A Study of English prose must include the genius of 
Sir Thomas Browne. That severe critic of English prose, 
Samuel Johnson, is reported to have imitated Browne's style. 
Boswell's Life of Johnson records the note that many critics 
of Johnson attribute his phraseology to the influence of 
Sir Thomas Browne, and Boswell himself acknowledges that 
Johnson's early essays were directly influenced by Browne.  ^
Johnson's first biography was the Life of Sir Thomas Browne, 
published with an edition of Browne's Christian Morals. 
Coleridge analyzed Browne carefully but sympathetically:
"Sir Thomas Browne is among my first favorites, rich in var­
ious knowledge, exuberant in conceptions and conceits, con­
templative, imaginative; often truly great and magnificent 
in his style and diction. . . .  He is a quiet and sublime 
enthusiast with a strong tinge of the fantast— the humourist 
constantly mingling with, and flashing across, the philo­
sopher, as the darting colours in shot silk play upon the
James Boswell, Boswell's Life of Johnson (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 158. Boswell's notation 
is as follows: "Sir Thomas Brown, whose life Johnson wrote,
was remarkably fond of Anglo-Latian diction; and to his 
example we are to ascribe Johnson's sometimes indulging him­
self in this kind of phraseology."
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main dye. . . . "  Among novelists, Herman Melville professed 
a fascination for Browne.^
The contemporary student of style confronts a number 
of problems, however, in the attempt to praise the achieve­
ment of Browne. For most contemporary readers, Browne is 
too Latinate, too obscure, too prolix. He appears to exceed
the necessities of a clear and understandable style. Modern
readers classify Browne as an outmoded classical writer, 
one who by imitating the style of the ancients condemned
himself to obscurity in an age which prizes clarity and brevity,
Style is an elusive literary quality which may be 
describable only in terms of a period of history, particular 
cultural expectations, prevailing theories of rhetoric and 
logic, and the relationship between technology and informa­
tion flow. All of these cultural influences define the 
effectiveness and the aesthetic of language. Browne's liter­
ary genius transcends such culture-bound conventions as the
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Literary Remains of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, II (New York: AMS Press, 1967),
p. 413.
^Herman Melville, The Letters of Herman Melville, 
ed. Merrell R. Davis and William H. Gilman (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1960), p. 78. In a letter to Evert A. 
Duyckinck, March 3, 1849, Melville writes, "Lay it down that 
had not Sir Thomas Browne lived, Emerson would not have 
mystified. . . ." The editors note that Melville borrowed 
two volumes of Browne from Duyckinck in 1848; Melville appar­
ently bought his own copies of Browne a year later. R. M. 
Weaver, in Herman Melville, Mariner and Mystic (New York: 
Doran, 1920), notes Melville's continuing interest in Browne, 
In London, 1849, Melville "haunted the bookshops" and pur­
chased Rousseau's Confessions as well as an 1686 folio of 
Sir Thomas Browne (p. 299).
metaphysical conceit, the symmetrical sentence, or the Latinate 
diction. If Browne's prose receives a just evaluation, it 
must be praised for the perfection of an aesthetic which 
will endure beyond the mutability of English words and
4
sentences.
This aesthetic manifests itself as a very rich, fecund 
concept of imagination. Egon Stephen Merton recognized the 
significance of imagination for Browne in his work Science 
and Imagination in Sir Thomas Browne.^ A remarkably lucid 
study of Browne's interpretation of seventeenth-century 
science, this work will probably remain one of the most appre­
ciative studies of Browne's imagination. Merton begins his 
study of Browne with this assertion: "The circumference of
Browne's being is represented by his science; the center, 
by his i m a g i n a t i o n . B r o w n e  is, he says, outwardly a physi­
cian, inwardly a poet. The circumference includes most of 
his work; the center illumines the last of Urne Buriall, 
the last paragraphs of the Garden of Cyrus, and "countless
7
paragraphs of the Reliqio Medici." Merton defines his own
Most readers of Browne feel compelled to interpret 
Browne holistically, perhaps because the most common praise 
of Browne is veneration for his style. Austin Warren, in 
"The Style of Sir Thomas Browne," Kenyon Review, 13 (1951), 
674-687, voices this compulsion: "This essay was prompted
by the sense that Browne, much written on . . . still lacked 
integral treatment: he had been studied as a figure in the
history of ideas . . . and he had been considered by narrowly 
stylistic methods. . . . "
^Egon Stephen Merton, Science and Imagination in Sir 




attempt to penetrate Browne's genius as an attempt to "seek 
the center from the circumference." Merton's book is basic­
ally a study of Browne's science. Merton classifies Browne's 
mind as "an eclectic rather than a philosophic mind." Merton 
is convinced that Browne's poetic capacities were the gratui­
tous results of his scientific endeavors. He explains many 
of the ambiguities in Browne as the products of an inner, 
conflict in Browne between his natural gift for poecic express­
ion and his profession as a scientist.
If Merton sought the center from the circumference, 
the present study seeks the circumference from the center. 
Browne's imagination explains not only his science but his 
genius as a prose artist. Browne is neither the pure scientist 
nor the pure philosopher; neither is he the casual herbalist.
He is the poet, allowing his imagination to play with the 
varieties of human experience as he perceives them.
Browne's imagination was fired by the processes of the 
art of meditation, as it was practiced in seventeenth-century 
Europe. The present study deals with the relationship between 
the art of meditation and Browne's writings. I felt that 
previous approaches to Browne had dealt extensively with 
other significant aspects of Browne's intellectual and cultur-
p
al environment. Previous studies of Browne's style obviate
Q
The intensive studies of Browne by Joan Bennett (Sir 
Thomas Browne, Cambridge, 1952) and Frank L. Huntley (Sir 
Thomas Browne, Ann Arbor, 1962) reveal the biographical, 
religious, and philosophical influences on Browne. Bennett's 
perceptive observations on Browne's domestic life and immedi­
ate cultural milieu place him firmly in a tradition which
g
an additional analysis of sentence patterns. Distinguished 
critics have characterized Browne's position as scientist.
I remain convinced that a study of the art of meditation best 
explains the working of Browne's imagination. Meditation 
offered to him an acceptable mode of preserving the beauty 
and mystery of imaginative prose. Professor Louis Martz has 
effectively demonstrated the relationship between the art of 
meditation and the poetry of the seventeenth century. He 
affirms the possibility of a common source of creativity in 
both the arts of poetry and meditation: "Poetry and medita­
tion are by no means synonymous; and yet there is, I believe.
Browne himself is reluctant to reveal in his writings. 
Huntley's study of the religious controversies of Browne's 
day provide helpful insight into the religious tradition of 
Browne. William P. Dunn (Sir Thomas Browne" A Study in 
Religious Philosophy, Minneapolis, 1950) studies Browne within 
the context of Platonic philosophy, and Leonard Nathanson (The 
Strategy of Truth, Chicago, 1967) refines the study of Browne 
the philosopher to emphasize Browne's epistemology.
g
In addition to the remarkably fine analysis of style 
by Bennett, Huntley, Dunn, and Nathanson, such general works 
as Rosamund Tuve's Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery 
(Chicago, 1947) and Ruth Wallerstein's Studies in Seventeenth- 
Century Poetic (Madison, 1966) provide exhaustive treatment 
of the analysis of seventeenth-century style. Morris Croll's 
Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm (Princetown, 1966 ), is unsurpassed, 
not only for a study of seventeenth-century rhetoric but for 
a close analysis of Browne's style. Joan Webber's Eloguent 
"I" (Madison, 1968) studies Browne's style as an integral 
part of the genre within which Browne wrote.
^^The most fascinating study of Browne's science is 
Egon Stephen Merton's Science and Imagination in Sir Thomas 
Browne (New York, 1949), but readers interested in Browne's 
science should also consult Jeremiah S. Finch, Sir Thomas 
Browne: A Doctor's Life of Science and Faith (New York,
1950), and Gordon Chalmers, "Sir Thomas Browne, True Scien­
tist," Osiris, 2 (1936), pp. 28-79. A more general work 
which reveals the relationship between science and religion 
in the seventeenth century is Paul Kocher's Science and 
Religion in Elizabethan England (New York, 1953).
a middle ground of the creative mind in which the two arts 
meet to form a poetry of meditation."^^ Similarly, there 
is a relationship between the processes of creativity in 
meditation and the processes of creative prose.
Renaissance writers concerned themselves with the 
nature of the creative process. And both the art of medita­
tion and the art of rhetoric present the timeless quest for 
understanding the way in which the mind perceives order in 
chaos, the way in which it fuses the perceptions of abstrac­
tion with intuitive response to produce meaningful symbols. 
Both the art of meditation and the art of rhetoric celebrate 
the mystery and ambiguity of language as well as the utilitar­
ian purposes of language. Both the art of meditation and the 
art of rhetoric revere the potential of language for preserv­
ing that most basic of human needs, the need of one human being 
to relate to another through the emotional efficacy of symbol.
The art of meditation offered Browne an appropriate 
means of transcending forces operating in the seventeenth 
century to reduce language to utilitarian purposes. Browne 
is a transitional figure in the study of English prose. He 
is himself the "great and true amphibian" embodying aspects 
of both the classical and modern concepts of rhetoric.
Browne is a kind of synthesis ing force of the ancients and 
the moderns. He liked to draw contrasts between the ancients 
and the moderns, and he viewed himself as a peacemaker between
^^Louis L. Martz, The Poetry of Meditation (New Haven : 
Yale University Press, 1954).
the two eras. Unwilling to surrender the view of rhetoric 
as imitation of nature and of classical models, he nonethe­
less sympathized with the position of the New Scientists. 
Browne was irresistibly drawn to the experimental methods of 
the New Scientists, as his own record of experiments indi­
cates. But Browne was not invited to join the Royal Society,
suggesting that he was never fully regarded as a member of
12the New Scientists. Perhaps because Browne was thoroughly 
Aristotelian in the basic precepts of his biology, or perhaps 
because he would not relinquish his respect for classical 
rhetoric, he was not hailed as a forerunner of modern science 
or language.
One has only to read Thomas Sprat's view of language 
in his "History of the Royal Society" to understand why 
Browne is at such odds with certain aspects of the New 
Science :
Thus they have directed, judg'd, 
conjectured upon, and improved Experiments.
But lastly, in these, and all other busi­
nesses, that have come under their care; 
there is one thing more, about which the 
Society has been most sollicitons; and that 
is, the manner of their Discourse; which, 
unless they had been very watchful to keep 
in due temper, the whole spirit and vigour 
of their Design, had been soon eaten out, by 
the luxury and redundance of Speech. The ill 
effects of this superfluity of talking, have 
already overwhelm'd most other Arts and Pro­
fessions; insomuch, that when I consider the 
means of happy living, and the causes of 
their corruption, I can hardly forebear
12Browne's son, Edward, was an active member of the 
Royal Society, however, and Browne appears to have contributed 
papers to the society through his son. Robert Boyle had 
great respect for Browne's experiments.
recanting what I said before; and concluding 
that eloquence ought to be banish'd out of 
civil Societies, as a t^^ng fatal to Peace 
and good Manners. . . .
Sprat continues at length to condemn eloquence for its
corruptive power; metaphors and tropes must be eschewed for
their trickery and deceit, and words must be plain and
unadorned to approximate as closely as possible things, the
only substantial reality with which language is concerned.
Another force operating in the seventeenth century to
reduce language to utilitarian purposes was the force of
Puritanism. The Puritans condemned eloquence as a tool of
the devil for corrupting the minds of the youth. R. F. Jones,
in "The Humanistic Defence of Learning in the Mid-Seventeenth
Century," cites William Dell, the master of a college in
Cambridge University, as a notable Puritan who condemned
the classical poets "who were for the most part the Devils
Prophets, and delivered forth their writings in his spirit,
and who through the smoothness, quaintness, and sweetness
of their language do insensible instil the poison of lust
and wickedness into the hearts of y o u t h . R i c h a r d  Baxter,
one of the most respected Puritan ministers, is especially
harsh in his condemnation of classical rhetoric. Baxter
admonishes young ministers to "speak pertinently, plainly.
Richard Foster Jones, "The Humanistic Defence of 
Learning in the Mid-Seventeenth Century," in Reason and the 
Imagination, ed. Joseph A. Mazzeo (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 1962), p. 74.
14Jones, p. 75.
piercingly and somewhat p r o p e r l y . J o n e s  quotes Henry 
Wilkinson, another Puritan minister, who suggests that tropes 
of rhetoric destroy a proper attitude toward the worship of 
Christ: "Are swelling words suitable to this examination
of the Son of God? Is a lofty stile correspondent with 
this abasement? Is it fit to discourse sweetly and delight­
fully upon gall and vinegar, and to beset nailes and thornes 
with flowers of Rhetorick, and to bring our Savior in pompe 
of words, and vainglorious pagents of Art unto his crosse?"^^
Sir Thomas Browne lived and wrote when the forces of 
the New Science and of Puritanism urged a rejection of 
eloquence. The effects of these two forces, it may be noted 
along the way, are still felt in contemporary attitudes 
toward rhetoric. Browne, as a transitional figure, exists 
as a reminder that the tradition of classical rhetoric is 
not wholly alien to the modern temper, and that the processes 
of the mind, preserved in the Western cultural traditions of 
logic, rhetoric, and poetic persist in the creations of 
artistic language.
Morris Croll has most accurately and incisively placed
Browne in a tradition of prose writers. His essay, "Attic
Prose in the Seventeenth Century," provides the clearest
17insight into the nature of Browne's prose. Browne belongs.
Jones, p. 75.
Jones, p. 76.
Morris W. Croll, Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm, ed.
J. Max Patrick and Robert 0. Evans (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966).
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according to Croll, in the tradition of the Anti-Ciceronians, 
or those who write "Attic" as opposed to "Asiatic" prose.
These two prose traditions had their origin in Greek and 
Latin antiquity, the Asiatic tradition describing the orator­
ical rhetoric of Cicero, and the Attic tradition describing 
the familiar rhetoric of Seneca, Tacitus, and Lucan.
In order to understand Croll's perception of Browne
in the Attic tradition, it is necessary to understand Croll's
18descriptions of these two classical modes of rhetoric. The 
Ciceronian rhetoric was the language of oratory, appealing 
with its sensuous rhythms, to the ear of the listener. The 
Latin rhetoric was the language of the essay, intended to 
promote the discipline of philosophy. Not primarily concerned 
with the affective aspect of language, it was aimed at the 
individual thinking mind. Croll contends that the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries are comparable to the Greek and 
Latin eras; the sixteenth century used rhetoric for oratorical 
purposes, and the seventeenth century, the age of Montaigne 
Lipsius, used rhetoric in the philosophical essay, whose aim 
was evocation of self-knowledge. Aristotle's Rhetoric was 
helpful in this use of rhetoric, as Croll suggests: "This
book was a wholly new thing in the world: for the theory
of rhetoric was here worked out for the first time, not on 
the basis of the susceptibilities of audiences, and the aural
18I am in sympathy with Croll's classifications of 
Asiatic and Attic prose; I am aware, however, that critics 
of Croll's position could protest that he was superimposing 
somewhat artificial classifications upon English prose.
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effect of language, but on the basis of the processes of 
reasoning and in strict relations with the science of 
logic.
The Anti-Ciceronians did not denigrate the beautiful
turn of phrase of oratory, but they sought to persuade by
logic and not by emotion, "by portraying in one's style
exactly those athletic movements of the mind by which it
arrives at a sense of reality and the true knowledge of it-
20self and the world." The Anti-Ciceronians tried to portray
the reality of the mind in its active movements toward truth.
Croll describes this activity as a penetrating search for
inward and moral truth:
It was a reality not visible to the eye, but 
veiled from common observation; hidden in a 
shrine toward which one might win his way, 
through a jostling, noisy mob of illusory 
appearances, by a series of partial initia­
tions. This kind of reality can never be 
quite portrayed, of course, because ultimate
knowledge of the mystery of truth is never
attained. But it is at least possible to 
depict the effort of the athletic and disci­
plined mind in it| progress toward the un­
attainable goal.
Prose writers like Browne decried the artificiality 
of imitation of the ancients, while at the same time they 
admired their Latin models. Their own prose was the search 
for a style which would reveal the nakedness of the mind in
^^Croll, p. 95. 
^°Croll, p. 194. 
^^Croll, p. 201.
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its search for truth. Croll describes the seventeenth-
century Anti-Ciceronians as explorers in search of a form
that would express the "candor of the soul." Their search
for a style, he says, must include a mode of depicting "the
difficulties of a soul exploring unfamiliar truth by the
22unaided exercise of its own faculties."
The prose style of the seventeenth century had to
include, along with "ceremonious dignity," the capacity for
profound moral experience: "A prose style that should
adequately express this age must contrive, therefore, to
mingle elements that in any other period would appear oddly
contrasted. It must be at once ingenious and lofty, intense
yet also profound, acute, realistic, revealing, but at the
same time somewhat grave and mysterious. It must have in
short that curious sublimity which is felt in the painting
of El Greco, in the sermons and letters of Donne, and in
23certain sculptures of Bernini."
The New Science had one profoundly beneficial effect 
for writers like Browne, and that was the tendency to apply 
the methods of science to the Stocial and Christian search 
for self-knowledge. In a curious kind of amalgamation, 
writers like Bacon, DesCartes, Wotton, Pascal, and Browne 
applied the schematics of science to the realm of moral 
experience. Croll mentions one writer, an Anglican minister, 
as the especial symbol of this amalgamation; that writer, so
^^Croll, p. 210. 
^^Croll, p. 223.
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important to this present study of Browne, is Bishop Joseph 
Hall, whose Epistles and Meditations reflect the intense 
moral spirit of the seventeenth century and the scrupulous 
method of the logician and scientist.
Croll attempts to describe the uniqueness of seventeenth-
century prose : "For this tendency there is unfortunately
no convenient name in English. 'Metaphysical' is even a less
happy term to describe the kinds of prose in which it appears
than the related kinds of poetry, and there seems to be no
possibility of making a practicable adjective or noun in
English from the continental terms concettism, etc. It may
be known as the 'prose of imaginative conceit' in order that
we may keep in line with the terms of current criticism.
In a final attempt to explain Anti-Ciceronian prose, Croll
recalls the significant relationship between logic and
rhetoric: "Their purpose was to portray, not a thought, but
a mind thinking, or, in Pascal's words, la peinture de la
penseei They knew that an idea separated from the act of
experiencing it is not the idea that was experienced. The
ardor of its conception in the mind is a necessary part of
its truth; and unless it can be conveyed to another mind in
something of the form of its occurrence, either it has
changed into some other idea or it has ceased to be an 
25idea. . . ." Seventeenth-century prose artists chose to
^^Croll, p. 228. 
^^Croll, p. 228.
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express their perceptions "in the moment in which truth is 
still imagined."
With Croll's appreciative study in mind, the present 
study of Browne focuses on the art of meditation as the 
means at Browne's disposal for transmuting the concepts of 
seventeenth-century science and religion into meaningful 
poetic symbols. Meditation, with its schema for personaliz­
ing concepts and for allowing the thinking self to withdraw 
temporarily from the object of thought, is a comfort to the 
creative mind. It is one of the means Browne chose to 
facilitate the operation of his imagination.
The imfluence of the art of meditation of Sir Thomas 
Browne may be examined from two broad perspectives. From 
the perspective of content, Browne's contemplations follow 
the meditative tradition of the "Book of the Creatures," 
popularized by the German mystic Jacob Boehme but probably 
initiated by St. Francis of Assisi. The subject matter of 
Browne's writings is, for the most part, the minutiae of 
the created order. Even the most reflective aspects of the 
Reliqio Medici are never far removed from the observations 
of this world. And Browne's most intense meditations, the 
Urne Buriall and the Garden of Cyrus, are saturated with the 
creatures of this world. This tradition of meditation 
worships God by a wholesome appreciation of His created 
order. Browne's distinctive contribution, as a transitional 
fugure, is the working of his synthetic imagination to fuse 
the devotion of the mystical writer with the humane reason
15
of the scientist. The products of Browne's imagination are 
not the pious writings of the cloistered monk nor the dream 
visions of the medieval mystics; neither are they the cryptic 
notes of an experimental scientist. They are the artistry 
of the imaginative writer who synthesizes his analytical 
perceptions of the created order with the spirit of devotion. 
The result for Browne, and for certain prose writers after 
him, is a secularized metaphysic palatable to the modern 
temper though not the less profound for its insight into the 
human psyche, humanistic values, and the relation of the soul 
to God.
From a second perspective, the thought processes 
Browne demonstrates in his prose have much in common with the 
thought processes involved in the art of meditation. The 
Reliqio may be interpreted as a kind of dialectic which 
proceeds from reason to emotion and eventually to the con­
scious acts of will involved in faith. The unevenness and 
ambiguity of the Reliqio are deliberate; they portray "the 
candor of the soul," the "athletic movement of the mind" 
as Browne's persona struggles toward certainty in the know­
ledge of God and of himself.
The external structure of the Reliqio may conform to 
the "stair of meditation," a method of meditation which 
probably originated with Joannus Mauburnus; it was popular­
ized by Cardinal Robert Bellarmine in The Ascent of the Mind 
to God and reinterpreted by Bishop Joseph Hall in The Art of 
Divine Meditation (1606). The dialectic present in Browne's
16
prose affords him the opportunity of a reflective stance, 
allowing him the freedom of withdrawing from the flow of 
his thoughts to view them from a transcendent perspective. 
This quality of Browne's prose contributes to the making of 
one of the most complicated personae in all of English prose. 
Browne's persona is elusive, erratic, both visible and 
invisible, giving his prose an uneven quality and a constant 
movement from subjective reflection to objective 
disinterestedness.
The dialectic of meditation allows Browne to operate 
by "contraries" in the mind. The ability to hold contradic­
tions in the mind at the same time indicates the sophistica­
tion of Browne's contemplative imagination. What he cannot 
explain by reason, he adheres to by faith. And reason and 
faith often possess Browne's mind in a stunning discordia 
concors. The darkness of the mind lives alongside the light 
of faith, often producing the paradoxes for which Browne is 
so memorable. Browne's thought is stimulated by 
ambiguity, and his faith rests in uncertainty, an unsettling 
phenomenon for readers unfamiliar with this meditative 
tradition.
The meditative process also allows Browne's imagina­
tion to play on the level of discursive reasoning and the 
level of symbol simultaneously. By evoking responses to 
symbols, Browne touches the reader at a basic level of 
emotional response, but the framework of his prose is logical
17
and rational. The reader is usually unaware that these two 
levels are being brought together. The process of mind 
begun in logical thought often ends in a curious symbol 
which is emotionally satisfying but logically inconclusive. 
The thought processes of meditation, which may be observed 
in the dialectical patterns of the Reliqio, are both dis­
cursive and emotional. The reader is led quite rationally 
through Browne's arguments for his faith in God, but at the 
same time the reader is somewhat unconsciously aware that 
Browne's arguments are proving nothing in terms of logic.
The moments of "rest" or certainty in the Reliqio are those 
pauses in the dialectic when Browne "freezes" his thought 
in a cryptic metaphor or symbol ("Thus is man that great 
and true amphibian"). The reader is temporarily satisfied 
but vaguely aware that the matter of discussion (the nature 
of man) is really not resolved.
This kind of dialectic, so readily observable in the 
Reliqio because Browne does actually portray a mind in the 
process of thinking, is refined in the Urne Buriall and the 
Garden of Cyrus. Browne appears to be more conscious of the 
effects of this kind of thought process. He uses the dia­
lectic to engage the reader's mind as Browne, the writer, 
teases the reader from symbol (urn, quincunx) to discursive 
explanations of the symbol. The thought processes visible 
in Urne Buriall and the Garden of Cyrus have been described 
as "cryptic," the essential Browne. But they are most
18
understandable as the refinement of a kind of dialectic 
which prefers to leave enigmas unresolved.
Finally, the meditative process allows Browne to be 
one of the great ironists of English literature. His 
reflective stance allows him to shift positions with little 
or no explanation. What appears certain truth in one part 
of the Religio may be refuted in another. Perhaps the 
greatest irony exists in Browne's perception of himself as 
a writer; knowing that his words will become "superannuated 
folly," he cannot resist the attempt to portray the movement 
of his mind in search for the truth.
Chapter One of this study of Browne attempts to 
place Browne in the tradition of meditative literature. 
Western meditation has a variety of manifestations, but in 
general certain basic trends can be traced from the early 
Church Fathers to the seventeenth century. Browne fits 
very well into the kind of contemplative meditation that 
finds its roots in the thought of St. Augustine. Chapter 
Two attempts to draw relationships between rhetoric, logic, 
poetic, and the art of meditation. Western meditation 
appears to have nurtured the arts of rhetoric and logic, 
and, in certain time periods, it seems to have profoundly 
influenced the creative process. Chapter Two defines the 
kind of meditation found in Bishop Joseph Hall's Art of 
Divine Meditation, a work which had the most direct influ­
ence on Browne's meditational thought. Chapter Three
ly
interprets the Religio Medici in terms of the "Scale of 
Meditation." Chapter Four explores the imaginative products 
of Browne’s meditational thought. And Chapter Five is a 
study of Urne Buriall and the Garden of Cyrus as the most 
carefully constructed products of Browne's imagination. In 
terms of. content and structure, Browne's writings reflect 
the kind of thought processes familiar to those who practice 
the art of meditation. In this sense, Western meditation 
may have enhanced creative processes of mind; it is safe to 
say that meditation facilitated Browne's view of the circum­
ference of knowledge from the center of his imagination.
CHAPTER I
SIR THOMAS BROWNE AND 
THE MEDITATIVE TRADITION
Sir Thomas Browne's participation in the meditative 
tradition of the seventeenth century deserves more detailed 
examination than critics have acknowledged. That Browne 
was a member of the medical profession, a scholar, a dabbler 
in the new experimental science, a collector of odd bits of 
antiquity and history has led his admirers to emphasize one 
of these roles as the contributing factor to his worth as a 
writer. His uniqueness as a writer has been described as 
the rare achievement of eclecticism in which the marriage 
of science and religion produces brilliant works of imagi­
nation. The precise nature of Browne's imagination, however, 
has never been seriously studied. His imagination oper­
ates in a meditative tradition familiar to students of 
Western culture. Browne is the most subtle but most per­
sistent example of the contemplative imagination in the 
seventeenth century.
The contemplative imagination, as the term is used 
in this work, derives from the art of meditation as it was
20
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practiced in the seventeenth century. Some critics have 
raised the question of Browne's mystical tendencies.
Leonard Nathanson traces the various responses: Robert
Sencourt (1923) claims that Browne is a true mystic; 
Jeremiah Finch (1940) considers the question but leaves 
it open-ended; W. P. Dunn (1950) says that Browne is too 
interested in finding out why grass in green and blood 
is red to be a true mystic.^ Nathanson himself flatly re­
jects the possibility that Browne is a part of the mystical 
tradition. He does so on the basis that Browne's Religio 
Medici is neither a confession of salvation nor an exul­
tation in the mysteries of the Christian religion: "His 
religious experience tends to focus upon the creatures 
rather than upon the mysteries of divinity, which draw
him into religious speculation, or than upon the things
2
of the Cross, which hardly appear at all." Nathanson 
sees the o altitude passage as a rare outburst for Browne, 
not typical of the corpus of Browne's works.
Browne's significance in the meditative tradition 
is obscured by the ambiguities of the terms "mystical," 
"devotional," "meditative," and "contemplative." Christian 
mysticism in Western thought has its roots in the Old and 
New Testaments, particularly in the writings of the
^Leonard Nathanson, The Strategy of Truth: A Study
of Sir Thomas Browne (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,




psalmists, the prophets, and in the writings of St. Paul ; 
it owes much of its impetus to the Confessions of St. 
Augustine, who fused the Hebrew concepts of direct con­
frontation with God with Neoplatonic concepts of the 
impulse toward union with the One God. Evelyn Underhill's 
studies of mysticism have illuminated Christian mysticism 
from an historical and psychological perspective.^ She 
defines mysticism as "the direct intuition of experience 
of God" and a mystic as "a person who has, to a greater 
or less degree, such a direct experience— one whose re­
ligion and life are centred, not merely on an accepted 
belief or practice, but on that which he regards as first­
hand personal knowledge."^ For a Christian mystic, the 
most important kinds of experiences are those which lead 
to union with God, a "communion of love." The conscious­
ness of the Reality of God becomes the object of the mystic's 
life. Underhill briefly sketches the traditional ways of 
knowing God: natural theology, in which human beings
learn of God through a study of the natural world; dogmatic 
theology, in which men learn of God through divinely re­
vealed Scriptures; and mystical theology, in which men find 
God "through the soul's secret and direct experience."^
^Evelyn Underhill, The Mystics of the Church (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1964) , pp. 3-4.
^Underhill, pp. 14-15.
^Underhill, p. 11.
Underhill does not see the mystical temperament as 
one belonging to a selected few but as a characteristic 
which all human beings possess to some degree: "We cannot
say that there is a separate 'mystical sense,' which some 
men have and some have not, but rather that every human soul 
has a certain latent capacity for God, and that in some this 
capacity is realized with an astonishing richness."  ^ The 
great mystics are those who have allowed that capacity for 
God to be filled in its most creative way; they are "geniuses 
in the sphere of religion . . . people who see and exper­
ience more vividly a Reality which is there for us 
all. . . ."7
David Knowles, in The English Mystical Tradition,
defines mysticism similarly, emphasizing that the terms
"mystic" and "mystical" should be understood in the sense
in which religious writers from the Middle Ages to the
sixteenth century understood it— as the secret knowledge
of God. Knowles points out that mystical knowledge of
God has three main characteristics:
It is recognized by the person concerned as 
something utterly different from and more real 
and adequate than all of his previous knowledge 
and love of God. It is experienced as some­
thing at once immanent and received, something 
moving and filling the powers of the mind and 
soul. It is felt as taking place at a deeper 
level of the personality and soul than that on 
which the normal processes of thought and will
^Underhill, p. 14. 
^Underhill, p. 14.
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take place, and the mystic is aware, both in 
himself and in others, of the soul, its qua­
lities and of the divine presence and action 
within it, as something wholly distinct from 
the reasoning mind with its powers.
Knowles' study is helpful in that it suggests the necessity 
for studying mysticism within a particular historical per­
spective. A study of mysticism is hardly separable from 
the historical period during which it flourished. Neither 
is a study of mysticism separable from the particular per­
sonality and temperament of the mystic himself. Knowles' 
study focuses on the Catholic mystical tradition in England 
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In establish­
ing a context, he traces the significant developments of 
mysticism from the time of Augustine. Such developments 
are helpful in understanding the religious atmosphere of 
seventeenth-century England.
The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle emphasized 
the importance of cultivation of the intellect for the pur­
pose of the soul's attainment of eternal ideas and the soul's 
gradual outgrowth of materiality. As Knowles suggests,
"Man's highest activity and the goal of his endeavor was 
a life, either here or hereafter, spent in the life of con-
9
templation." Plato and Aristotle, however, viewed this 
intellectual activity as the desirable goal of every human
g
David Knowles, The English Mystical Tradition (New 




mind and not as a special religious activity. It was not 
until the teachings of Plotinus and other Neoplatonic 
philosophers that the life of contemplation became a reli­
gious quest. Knowles describes this process: "For Plotinus
the universe of spirit, and in particular the individual 
human soul, yearned to return to Mind from which it had 
come forth and to contemplate, in union with Mind, Mind 
itself, the author and exemplar of being, truth, and 
g o o d n e s s . K n o w l e s  sees the significance of Plotinus 
in three areas: "The contemplative life as the goal above
all other activities for the human soul; the intellectual 
contemplation of divine truth; and the God-given, ecstatic, 
ineffable union of love."^^
Early Church Fathers, influenced by Plotinian thought,
assimilated these ideas into the Christian's experience of
the knowledge of God. Origen and Clement of Alexandria, not
mystics themselves, made the distinction between the active
life of good works and the life of contemplation. St.
Gregory of Nyssa, often called "the father of Christian
mysticism," elaborates on the distinctness of these two kinds
of Christian dedication and emphasizes the mind going out of
12itself to the unknowable.
Alexandrian monks eventually made specific the 




summarizes these as follows:
The active pursuit of the virtues accompanied 
by abnegation of all kinds; the progress 
towards recollection and the transcendence 
of things pleasurable and painful; the gradual 
attainment of purity of heart; an insistence 
on the intimate connection between the growth 
in virtues, particularly those of charity and 
faith, and the advance in purity and facility 
in prayer; and, finally, the all-important 
recognition of a direct, experienced divine 
assistance making possible a kind of prayer 
and a mode of virtuous living and acting of 
which human nature, even when trained and 
purified and assisted W  "ordinary grace," 
must remain incapable.
It was from the Alexandrians that Augustine received 
the most benefit in his contemplative life. However, in­
stead of designing a model program of the contemplative 
way, Augustine described his own spiritual life. Perhaps 
the chief contribution of Augustine to the Western mystical 
tradition was the personal, confessional mode of his writings, 
and the sophistication with which he imbued these writings 
by the process of his own mind, disciplined as it was by his 
study of Greek philosophy.
According to Knowles, Augustine initiated one of 
two major strands of mystical tradition. Augustine's 
writings have caused debate, since some religious writers 
do not consider him fully mystical because of the absence 
of hallucinatory phases of his religious life, visions, 
ecstasies, and the conspicuous presence of the supernatural.
^^Knowles, p. 24.
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Knowles says it is possible that Augustine was describing 
"the occasional intellectual enlightenment regarding God 
Himself and other truths given to the mind in an experien­
tial, but not a strictly mystical v/ay."^^ Later mystical 
writers who follow the Augustinian pattern write experi- 
entially of the knowledge of God, reflectively considering 
the relationship of God and the world and the self, but 
without elements of the visionary writers. It is in this 
sense that some of the writers of the seventeenth century 
may reflect the contemplative tradition, and Browne fits 
well in this tradition.
The other major trend in Christian mystical tradition 
originated with Dionysius the Areopagite, about a century 
after A u g u s t i n e . T o  him later mystical writers owe the 
Neoplatonic concept of the attempt to know an ultimately 
unknowable God. Knowles says, "For him God is above all 
that can be attributed to him of perfections and is even 
above being itself. He is the One, ineffable, inexpress­
ible, unknowable, and Dionysius expounds on the one hand 
the Plotinian circle of the outgoing of all being from God, 
followed by its return. . . Thus, Dionysius initiated
a mystical tradition which eventuated in such English works 
as The Cloud of Unknowing. Those who subscribe to this
14Knowles, p. 24.
^^Knowles, p. 27. 
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Knowles, p. 27.
mystical tradition emphasize the ecstasy of the mystical 
experience, the inability to express the perception of God. 
Whereas Augustine perceived God to be the substance of the 
whole created order, able to be known by those who allow 
God to fill them with Himself, the Dionysian tradition 
perceived God as ultimately beyond the knowledge of man.
It cannot be overemphasized that mystical theology, 
rather than systematic or natural theology, from the time 
of Augustine through the sixteenth century, preserved for 
all of Western culture the knowledge of personal, direct 
experience with God. The Catholic mystical tradition 
nourished the Christian faith as no other single force 
had. The ravages of the Reformation left doubts which 
systematic theology, both Catholic and Protestant, could 
not readily resolve by reference to tradition. Personal 
religious experience became the means for restoration of 
faith.
The Reformation brought great divisiveness in 
religion. Rufus M. Jones says, "One of the greatest tra­
gedies in Christian history is the division of forces 
which occurred in the Reformation movements of the six­
teenth c e n t u r y . O n e  of the great impulses toward 
wholeness in religion came from the mystics. Jones 
mentions Nicholas of Cusa, who lived and wrote shortly
^^Rufus M. Jones, Spiritual Reformers in the Six- 
teenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Boston: Beacon Press,
1914), p. 1.
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before Luther was born. Jones emphasizes the importance 
of the mystics for the healing quality they brought to 
religion:
There was abroad at the opening of the Refor­
mation a deep yearning among serious people 
for a religion of inward experience, a reli­
gion based not on proof-texts nor on external 
authority of any kind, but on the native capa­
city of the soul to seek, to find and to enjoy 
the living God who is the Root and Sap of every 
twig and branch of the great tree of life. The 
general trend of this mystical tendency, as 
also of the Humanistic movement, was in the 
direction of lay-religion, and both movements 
alike emphasized the inherent and native capa­
city of man, whose destiny by his free choice 
is in his own hands.
The humanism of the seventeenth century, also a 
restorative force, received vitality from an experien­
tial form of religion rather than a traditional form of 
religion. As Jones points out, the humanists were con­
cerned with rediscovering the nature of man as a creature 
of reason, rather than as an abstract soul:
Man, the Humanists say, is possessed in his 
own right of great powers of reason. He is 
a creative and autonomous being, he has vast 
capacities for life and enjoyment to which 
the Church had failed to minister. They 
stood amazed at the artistic and literary 
culture, the political and intellectual free­
dom and the great richness of life which the 
newly discovered classical literature revealed 
as having existed in the pre-Christian world, 
and at the wonderful comprehension on life 
revealed in the Gospels.
It is helpful, when examining the sixteenth and 




keep in mind three distinctions which Jones makes regarding 
the spiritual movements of this age: the Mystical tendency,
the Humanistic or Rational tendency, and the distinctive 
Faith-tendency of the Reformation. Jones describes mysti­
cism in ways similar to those previously mentioned:
"Mysticism for the mystic himself is characterized by a 
personal experience through which the ordinary limitations 
of life and the passionate pursuits of the soul are tran­
scended, and a self-evident conviction is attained that he 
is in communion, or even in union, with some self-transcending 
Reality that absolutely satisfies and is what he has always
s o u g h t . L i k e  Evelyn Underhill, he concludes that "the
21great mystics are religious geniuses."
But Jones concentrates on the second kind of spirit­
ualist, in whom the influences of humanism are most evident. 
Jones explains that these religious writers embrace a wider 
scope of devotion and knowledge : "They all read and loved
the mystics and they themselves enjoyed times of direct 
refreshment from an inward Source of Life, but they were, 
most of them, at the same time, devoted Humanists. They 
shared with enthusiasm the rediscovery of those treasures 
which humem Reason had produced, and they rose to a more 




had prevailed in Christian circles since the days of the
22
early Greek Fathers."
These spiritualists emphasized that the reason of man
does not conflict with the presence of God within man. Jones
says, "They took a variety of roads to their conclusion, but
in one way or another they all proclaimed that deep in the
central nature of man— an inalienable part of Reason— there
was a Light, a Word, an Image of God, something permanent,
reliable, universal, and unsundered from God himself. They
23all knew that man is vastly more than 'mere man.'" Quite 
paradoxically, they discounted reason as a way to God, yet 
they had great respect for man's rationality. Jones traces 
the process whereby many of these rational humanists pro­
ceeded to the knowledge of God. Essentially, it was the 
incorporation of direct experience of God into a larger whole 
of knowledge:
The method of testing and verifying any fact of 
truth which we have on our hands, is always to 
organize it and link it into a larger whole of 
knowledge which we ourselves, or the wider group 
of persons in which we are organic members, have 
verified, and to see that it fits in consistently 
into this larger whole, and in this rational pro­
cess we always assume and are bound to assume 
some sort of Reality that transcends the fleeting 
and temporal, the caprice of the moment, the will 
of the subject, the here and now.




This way of approaching spiritual truth involved the mutual 
respect of the reason of man and of an ultimate Reality 
which produces some kind of order. Many spiritual leaders 
of the seventeenth century must be seen in this broader, 
humanistic context, and Sir Thomas Browne fits into this 
tradition. At the same time that he attempted a synthesis 
of knowledge, he was deeply concerned with the inner nature 
of man and man's inward search for God. Browne very humbly 
recognized the centuries of Christian tradition which had 
preceded him, and he sought carefully the manner of his own 
expressions of religious experience.
Sir Thomas Browne inherited the values of a long tradi­
tion of contemplative writers. He represents the best 
qualities of the Augustinian meditative tradition, tempered 
by the humanism of the seventeenth century. If "meditation" 
means the approach to God by means of visions, ecstacies, 
and emotional outpourings of the spirit, then by no means 
could Browne be considered as a part of the meditative 
tradition. But if it means the prolonged dialogue of the 
soul with God, then Browne must be considered a part of the 
meditative tradition. The dialogue is readily perceived in 
the Religio Medici. Although some critics persist in inter­
preting the Religio as purely philosophical, this work is 
more accurately viewed as an intense personal dialogue be­
tween the persona and God. In the Religio, Browne achieves 
the ultimate meditative experience of being involved, as a
j j
subjectf in a vast realm of experience and of being detached 
from that experience to reflect upon it. He becomes both 
subject and object. And without relinquishing his control 
of faith, he transcends his subjectivity to reflect upon 
that faith.
The dialogue is intricate, disturbing, and uneven.
But it is the profound interaction of one man's mind and 
spirit with God. Browne's other works reflect the medita­
tive tone set by the Religio. In them Browne views all 
objects of creation in one vast order. The Being of God 
stains all creation, and there is no object, no matter how 
miniscule, which cannot be explained as part of God's own 
Being. Browne possesses the mystic's optimism that the 
mind of man is analogous to the mind of God. Doubt is so much 
a part of Browne's belief that some have termed him skeptic; 
but Browne's rare achievement is the synchronous portrayal 
of the light of man's mind (reason) with the darkness of God 
(faith). The dialectic produced by the interaction of the 
mind of man with the Spirit of God leads the reader to 
deeper insight, both of himself and of the external created 
order. The total impact of Browne's writing is an urgent 
call to piety, both in the secular world and in the Christian 
tradition.
In the 1640's, when Browne was writing the Religio, 
a powerful surge of interest in the art of meditation was 
sweeping the continent of Europe and of England. Professor 
Louis L. Martz has successfully demonstrated the tremendous
34
impact which devotional and meditational writings had on
25English poets of the seventeenth century. Martz cites a
study of A. F. Allison and D. M. Rogers in 1956, "Catalogue
of Catholic Books in English Printed Abroad or Secretly in
England, 1558-1640," which includes over a thousand books 
26of meditation. Martz's own study. The Poetry of Meditation, 
deals with only half of these. Martz states very simply,
"The Art of Meditation constituted one of the great develop­
ments in European culture; its influence penetrates to the
27center of European consciousness in that period."
Martz's study grew from his careful scrutiny of a
comprehensive work on the growth of meditative exercises,
2 8Christian Spirituality by Pierre Pourrat. Pourrat traces 
meditational exercises from the early Fathers to the end of 
the seventeenth century. According to Pourrat, the mystical 
tradition begun by Church Fathers never died out during this 
period of history. A great movement toward religious medita­
tion began in the middle of the sixteenth century when the 
Pope approved the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius 
Loyola (1548).
25Louis L. Martz, The Poetry of Meditation (New Haven: 







The Jesuits in the sixteenth century stimulated the 
study of meditation, and from France, Spain, and Italy came 
some of the most influential patterns: The Book of Prayer
and Meditation (1554) by Fray Luis de Granada, The Spiritual 
Combat (1589) by Lorenzo Scupoli, and The Introduction to 
the Devout Life by St. Francois de Sales ( 1 6 0 9 ) These 
Catholic mystics probably most deeply affected all religious 
writers, even the Protestant writers of meditation.
Sir Thomas Browne, not usually characterized as a 
practitioner of the art of meditation, practiced devotion. 
Frank L. Huntley mentions a family legend that Browne's 
father would often kiss his sleeping child and pray that 
the Holy Ghost would inhabit there, a story, Huntley points 
out, that was also told of Origen's father. Huntley says, 
"Basking all his life in 'the mercifull disposition, and 
humane inclination I borrowed from my Parents,' Thomas 
Browne, the son, was grateful for an 'inbred loyalty unto 
vertue.'
Browne's first major work. The Religio Medici, 
reflects the dialectic of the art of meditation. An asser­
tion that Browne exhibits the mysticism of the Dionysian 
tradition would be a drasric misinterpretation of the
^^Martz, p. 5.
^^Frank L. Huntley, Sir Thomas Browne (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 1.
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Religio. But reading the Religio in light of works gener­
ally acknowledged as guides for the art of meditation reveals 
the meditative nature of the Religio. Browne would almost 
certainly have read spiritual exercises by continental 
writers during the four years (1629-1633) which he spent 
in Montpellier, Padua, and Leiden. He confesses to know 
well at least six languages and to have a reading knowledge 
of more. Readers of Browne have, fortunately, a list of
books that were in Browne's library when it was sold by his 
32son in 1711. It cannot be known with certainty, however,
whether this list is completely accurate, since Browne may
have lost or sold books before his son inherited the library.
Nevertheless, certain volumes are interesting for the study
of Browne's place in the meditative tradition. He owned
Ficino's Theologica Platonica, which, as Leonard Nathanson
points out, "reproduces the important statements and doc-
33trines of Plato, Plotinus, and the other Platonists." He 
also owned John Henley's translations of The City of God 
(second ed., 1620), which contained "Augustine's influential 
discussion of the Platonists in relation to Christian thought." 
Browne also owned books of Philo and the Christian Fathers, 
including a book of Dionysius the Areopagite. Most signifi­
cant for the study of meditation was Bonaventura's Méditationes 
(1638) and Cardinal Bellarmine's Ascent of the Mind to God.
32A Catalogue of the Libraries of the Learned Sir 
Thomas Brown, and Dr. Edward Brown, His Son, London, 1710-11
33Nathanson, p. 49.
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(Browne owned at least three copies of Bellarmine's work, 
one in Latin, one in English, and one in Italian.
Most convincing, however, for the influence of the 
art of meditation on Browne is the presence in his library 
of the works of Bishop Joseph Hall, including Hall's Art 
of Divine Meditation (1606).^^ Bishop Hall appears to have 
had the most significant influence on Browne's absorption 
of the meditative tradition. There can be little doubt 
that Browne knew him personally. Browne left little direct 
evidence of his friendship with Hall, as indeed he left 
little reference to other contemporaries. But Robert 
Ralston Cawley, in "Sir Thomas Browne and His Reading," 
indicates the mention of this friendship by John Whitefoot, 
Browne's close friend and first biographer. Whitefoot 
acknowledges that Browne was, as Cawley paraphrases Whitefoot, 
"close friend to Bishop Joseph Hall and to Arthur Dee. . .
A man of Browne's religious inclination would probably 
have cultivated the friendship of Hall, a well-read respected 
leader in the Anglican Church, Bishop of Norwich, where 
Browne practiced medicine from 1637 to 1682. One has only 
to read Hall's introduction to his Art of Divine Meditation
34Catalogue, pp. 11, 38, 45.
^^Cataloque, p..45.
^^Robert Ralston Cawley and George Yost, eds.. Studies 
in Sir Thomas Browne (Eugene, Oregon; University of Oregon 
Books, 1965), p. 111.
to appreciate the profound interest on the part of all edu­
cated men in meditational exercises.
Professor Martz traces the significance of Bishop 
Hall in the meditative tradition. His Art of Divine 
Meditation y published in 1606, grew out of the method of 
meditation set forth originally by Johan Wessell Gansfort 
in the fifteenth century. The Scala Meditatoria or Scala
Meditationis, popularized in the Rosetum of Joannes Mauburnus 
37(1494) . Most directly influential for Hall was the work 
of Jean le Charlier de Gerson, Chancellor of the University 
of Paris (1363-1429). Martz says, "His masterpiece. On the 
Mountain of Contemplation, exerted germinal influence upon 
all the most important meditative and mystical treatises 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: in England, the
treatise is cited as an authoritative work on meditation 
both by the future Bishop Hall and by the Puritan Richard
Baxter."38
There were thirteen editions of Hall's Art of Divine 
39Meditation by 1650. Hall acknowledges his debt to "one 
obscure nameless monk, which wrote some hundred and twelve 
years ago," who was probably, according to Martz, Johan 
Wessel Gansfort. Hall's dedication expresses the desire 




Martz, p. 332. 
3*Martz, p. 332.
allay strife rather than breed it. His main purpose is to
induce devotion and piety; at the close of the treatise he
reiterates his main theme: "It is not more impossible to
live without an heart, than to be devout without medita- 
40tion." Hall's purpose is not, noticeably, to induce spir­
itual states leading to ecstasies or visions. And although 
he lists the scale of meditation, he does not advocate strict 
adherence to it as a method. Hall describes, in Chapter I 
of his treatise, the benefits of meditation. He says that 
meditation is for all Christians, not only for the clergy or 
those limited to certain professions. By making the art of 
meditation the proper exercise of all Christians, he provides 
incentive for a physician like Browne to write down his own 
devout thoughts "in his solitary and retired imagination," 
at a place where he had not "the assistance of any good book," 
and at various snatches of time from the performance of his 
own profession.
In Chapter II, Hall defines meditation as "nothing 
else but a bending of the mind upon some spiritual object 
through divers forms of discourse, until our thoughts come 
to am issue. . . . The phrase "divers forms of discourse"
is especially significant, for Hall is not prescribing a kind
40
Joseph Hall, "The Art of Divine Meditation, In The 
Works of the Right Reverend Joseph Hall, ed. Philip Wynter 
(London, 1606, rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1969), p. 79.
41Sir Thomas Browne, The Works of Sir Thomas Browne, 
vol. I, Ed. Geoffrey Keynes (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1964), p. 10.
^^Hall, p. 48.
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of meditation which proceeds by the use of concrete images, 
or even the presence of concrete objects. He advocates a 
kind of meditation which proceeds by orderly discourse, a 
process which seems to begin with abstraction and issue in 
concrete forms.
Hall distinguishes between two kinds of meditation: 
one extemporal, "occasioned by outward occurrences offered
to the mind," the other "deliberate and wrought out of our
43own heart." The former consists mainly .in the use of 
reason to discover hidden truths in knowledge, the latter 
consists in kindling the affections towards God. Hall 
establishes, by defining these two kinds of meditation, a 
pattern which Browne employs with facility and grace. The 
first of these types of meditation does not derive exclu­
sively from Hall, but is the type of meditation practiced
by those Christians who meditate from "The Book of the
44Creatures." This type of meditation, first popularized
by the German mystic, Jacob Boehme in the sixteenth century,
is more personal than natural theology, and celebrates the
created order as the divine art of God. Hall explains this
type of meditation in more detail:
Man is placed in this stage of the world, to 
view the. several natures and actions of the 
creature; to view them, not idly, without his 
use, as they do him. God made all these for
4^Hall, p. 48.
44For a fuller discussion of this type of meditation, 
see Evelyn Underhill, The Mystics of the Church (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1964), pp. 213 ff.
41
man and man for his own sake. Both these pur­
poses were lost, if man should let the creatures
pass carelessly by him; only seen, not thought
upon. . . . Whence it is that wise Solomon
putteth the sluggard to school unto the ant, and
our Savior sendeth the distrustful to the lily 
of the field. In this kind was that meditation 
of the divine Psalmist; which, upon the view of 
the glorious frame of the heavens, was led to
wonder at the merciful respec^^God hath to so
poor a creature as man. . . .
Hall calls the world "this great volume of the creatures,"
and says that meditation on the creatures of God is not
only lawful but necessary: "The thoughts of this nature
are not only lawful, but so behoveful, that we cannot 
omit them without neglect of God, his creatures, ourselves. 
The creatures are half lost, if we only employ them, not 
learn something of them. . .
Browne's own preference for an approach to devotion 
is through God's creatures. Browne says that "in this 
masse of nature there is a set of things which carry in 
their front, though not in capital1 letters, yet in steno­
graphy, and short Characters, something of Divinitie, which 
to wiser reasons serve as Luminaries in the abysse of know­
ledge, and to judicious beliefes as scales and roundles to
47mount the pinnacles and highest pieces of Divinity."
Browne boldly describes his method of knowing God:
"My humble speculations have another Method and are content 





creatures, and the obvious effects of nature; there is no 
danger to profound these mysteries, no Sanctum sanctorum in 
Philosophy: The world was made to be inhabited by beasts,
but studied and contemplated by man: 'tis the debt of our
reason wee owe unto God, and the homage we pay for not being 
beasts.
Browne says that those who inquire into the natural
acts of God and into God's creatures only return "the duty
49of a devout and learned admiration." Browne follows the 
tradition of religious writers who teach that all the pro­
ducts of God's creativity glorify him by fulfilling their 
natures. A tree glorifies God by blossoming, growing strong, 
maturing and dying. But man, of all God's creations, cannot 
glorify God by simply fulfilling the biological potential 
in his body. Man alone was given the gift of reason, and by 
use of man's reason, rightly ordered and administered, man 
fulfills the purpose for which he was created.
Browne's method is not the casual remark of the 
curious scientist; it is the subscribing to a tradition of 
Christian meditation, as Browne knew it from Bishop Hall and 
others. The impelling force behind the meditations on the 
"Book of the Creatures" is the quest for the Being of God 
through the indirect signs of His creation. Boehme per­
ceived that the essence of the created order was a mysterious
^^Browne, p. 22. 
49Browne, p. 22.
fire, and he spoke obliquely of this fire as the light of 
God. Evelyn Underhill places Sir Thomas Browne, along 
with Boehme, in the category of those mystics who speak of 
the essence of God as fire.^^ Browne speaks of the "pure
flame of life" and "the invisible sun" within us. But the
biological metaphor is more suitable for Browne's quest. 
Through his intricate study of life forms, Browne was ob­
sessed with the very nature of life. The Being of God, to 
him, is mysteriously present in the seeds of weeds; in the 
seeds of all life forms are the potential discoveries of the 
nature of God Himself. It is accurate to state that the 
vibrant search of Browne's meditative writing is the search 
for the mystery of God's ingress and egress in visible life 
forms. The whole of life, to Browne, is like a vast texture 
of Being. The process of explaining this Being is the
poetry of Urne Buriall and the Garden of Cyrus.
The second of Hall's types of meditation, that which 
is "deliberate and wrought out of our own heart," origin­
ates from the darkness of the mind. The more complicated 
form of meditation interests Hall more than the "Book of 
the Creatures." He devotes most of his effort to the explan­
ation of the Stair of Meditation. Hall's interpretation 
shifts the emphasis from regimentation to "art." His subtle 
renaming of the various stages of meditation causes him to 
speak of this scale as a kind of dialectical, rhetorical
^^Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (New York: E. P. .
Dutton, 1930), pp. 143-148.
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process in which the reason of man suffuses light into the 
abysses of spiritual mysteries. Hall's emphasis is on the 
bringing of order out of chaos— the ability of man to use 
language to evoke meaningful creations, much as God spoke 
at the creation of the world to produce order out of chaos. 
This fascinating concern with the use of man's reason to 
cooperate with man's emotional response to God is a new 
translation of both rhetoric and spiritual exercises. And 
Sir Thomas Browne seizes upon this new interpretation of 
both language and devotion to be the means of practicing his 
own literary art. The stair of meditation articulated by 
Hall may be traced vividly in the Reliqio Medici to form the 
thought structure of this apparently diffuse work.
The influence of meditation of Browne seems to work 
in these two broad ways. All his works, with the possible 
exception of the Vulgar Errors, are meditations of "The 
Book of the Creatures." All his works utilize the dialectic 
of the stair of meditation, although the Reliqio is the most 
notable example. For purposes of illustrating the influence 
of meditation on Browne, it seems appropriate to examine 
first the dialectical, rhetorical processes at work in the 
art of meditation, and to show the evolution of these pro­
cesses from the arts of rhetoric and logic. Then Browne's 
symbolism becomes more explainable.
CHAPTER II
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AESTHETIC AND 
THE ART OF MEDITATION
Sir Thomas Browne's imagination was nourished by the 
art of meditation, but in order to appreciate fully the 
influence of meditation on Browne, it is necessary to show 
the intricate relationships between meditational writings 
and the development of an aesthetic theory in English liter­
ature in the seventeenth century. Browne's imagination, in 
a particular sense, was profoundly affected by the art of 
meditation; but the whole concept of imagination, in a 
general sense, was also affected by meditation.
The Renaissance shared with the medieval period some 
common assumptions about rhetoric, logic, and poetry.
Richard McKeon's "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages" provides the 
most exhaustive study of the interrelationship of these 
disciplines.^ Concepts of rhetoric in the Renaissance were 
generally founded on the writings of Cicero, the De Inventione, 
and the Ad Herennium (ascribed to Cicero but perhaps
^Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," 




anonymous)/ and the writings of Quintilian. According to 
McKeon, theories of rhetoric derived from the trivium of 
the medieval curriculum: rhetoric, grammar, and dialectic.
Rhetoric as a science progressed through several stages— it 
was, at the same time, the art of speaking well in oratory, 
the practical training in the writing of letters and docu­
ments, and the "practical discipline applied to preaching 
and prayer." Grammar was the study of the essential struc­
ture of language. And dialectic was the basis for logic, 
the end of which was persuasion by means of argument from 
syllogisms. But rhetoric, grammar, and logic tended to merge 
together. Various theoreticians drew fine and distinct lines 
between these disciplines in various periods of the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance. One common element in all their 
discussion was the purpose of rhetoric: its end was per­
suasion through eloquence and its medium was reason. No 
philosophic discipline could be expressed without due concern 
for rhetorical principles. Christianity grew, nourished by 
rhetoricians. Augustine depended heavily on Cicero, with the 
modification that there was a language to describe worldly 
things and a language to describe heavenly things. But the 
significant concept is that rhetoric and logic were intended 
to be reflections of the mind, and no scholarly endeavor 
could succeed without a proper use of them. The rhetoric and 
logic expounded was that of Cicero, Quintilian, Aristotle, 
Augustine, Boethius.
2
McKeon, pp. 2, 3.
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The effect of the dominance of rhetoric in the Middle 
Ages and early Renaissance is expressed in several works by 
English scholars of the sixteenth century. Sister Miriam 
Joseph's study of these rhetoricians provides clear insight 
into the dominance of the discipline of rhetoric.^ Her work. 
Rhetoric, in Shakespeare's Time, divides English rhetoricians 
into three categories: the traditionalists, who followed
slavishly the principles of Cicero and Quintilian; the 
Ramists, who followed the leadership of Petrus Ramus in 
subordinating rhetoric and grammar to logic; and the 
Figurists, who concerned themselves with the tropes of rhet-
4
oric. Representatives of the Traditionalists include 
Philip Melanchthon, Leonard Cox, and Thomas Wilson; repre­
sentatives of the Ramists include (besides Ramus himself) 
Dudley Fenner and Abraham Fraunce; the Figurists include 
Richard Sherry, Henry Peacham, and George Puttenham. To 
emphasize the magnitude of the influence of these rhetori­
cians, Joseph says:
These English works had in Tudor times a 
popularity, a vitality, and an importance 
astonishing to us today, due in part to 
the use of illustrations from matter of 
intense interest to the readers for whom 
the books were designed. The Latin works 
were school texts, but the English books 
circulated among adults, especially among 
those of the court and of the upper and 
middle classes. From 1551 to 1595 there 
were at least seven editions of Wilson's 
Rule of Reason and eight of his Arte of 
Rhétorique which was written, so the title
^Sister Miriam Joseph, C.S.C., Rhetoric in Shakespeare's 




page informs us, "for the use of all such as 
are studious of Eloquence"— as who in intell­
ectual circles in Tudor England was not?
Puttenham explicitly stated that he wrote his 
Arte for courtiers, and particularly for 
ladies, to assist them in gomposing and in 
appreciating polite verse.
The five traditional parts of rhetoric were inven­
tion, disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery. Joseph 
demonstrates how each of the three types of rhetoricians 
includes significant exposition for all five of these parts, 
though some emphasize one part over the others. Joseph 
further emphasizes the dependence of English rhetoricians 
on the classical theories of Cicero and Aristotle, while, 
at the same time they drew their examples of rhetoric from 
English poets— Spenser, Sidney, Wyatt, and Surrey.
English rhetoricians, however, were beginning to be 
more concerned with the structures of language in poetry 
and creative prose rather than with the structures of 
oratory or literature written for political purposes. The 
publication in English of Aristotle's Poetics began to 
attract more English writers than Aristotle's Rhetoric. 
English critics also became more conscious of the struc­
tures of English rather than Latin. For the first time, 
they began to formulate a poetic for the vernacular— their 
own poetry. They began a defense of English as a literary 
language. The most vocal English critics who defended the 
structures of the English language— Sidney, Spenser, Wilson, 
and Puttenham— emphasized a new concept in poetics; the
^Joseph, p. 18.
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psychology or state of mind of the individual writer. Cicero, 
Aristotle, Quintilian had excluded such matters, for this was 
not important for their main concern, the objective of per­
suasion through eloquence. A particular writer's psycholog­
ical state was of little consequence.
With the advent of aestheticians like George Puttenham 
and Sir Philip Sidney, however, a subtle turn to the disposi­
tion of the writer himself occurred. Murray W. Bundy's 
study of the distinction between the medieval rhetorical 
concept of "invention" and the Renaissance concept of "imagin­
ation" provides a most helpful insight into the shift of 
emphasis from the end product of rhetoric to the processes 
involved in the writer's mind.^ Bundy explains that the 
first stage was the appropriation by the Renaissance of the 
psychology of the Middle Ages: "The brain was divided into
three cells or ventricles: in the foremost were common
sense and imagination; in the middle, fantasy and judgment; 
and at the rear was memory."^ Bundy is careful to point 
out that, along with this understanding of the psychology 
of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance also inherited the dis­
trust of imagination as an indication of insanity. 
Shakespeare's Midsummer Night's Dream confirms this view 
when Theseus says that the lunatic, the lover, and the poet 
are of imagination all compact. (V,i)) A third inheritance
^Murray W. Bundy, "'Invention' and 'Imagination' in 




from the Middle Ages was a mystical view of imagination 
deriving from Plato and Plotinus and the medieval mystics' 
interpretations of these powers of the soul, and the vision 
of Dante, which in its breadth and profundity validated the
Q
mystical powers of the imagination.
Bundy proceeds to clarify the Renaissance treatment 
of the three major rhetorical processes— invention, disposi­
tion and elocution. He emphasizes that Renaissance writers 
modified the principle of invention, so that it seldom 
meant what medieval and classical rhetoricians meant by it. 
Bundy quotes from George Gascoigne;
The first and most necessarie poynt that euer 
Iifounde meete to be considered in making of 
a delectable poeme is this, to grounde it 
upon some fine inuention. For it is not 
inough to roll in pleasant woordes . . . un- 
lesse the Inuention have in it also alquis 
salis I meane some good and fine duise, shew­
ing the quicke capacitie of a writer.
This description reveals invention as the source of original 
concepts. Bundy's most significant example comes from 
Stephen Hawes' The Pastime of Pleasure, in which "imagina­
tion" is seen as the help-mate of invention:
And secondly/ by ymagynacyon 
To drawe a mater/ full facundyous 
Full meruaylous/ is the operacyon 
To make of nought/ reason sentencyous 
Clokynge a trouthe/ with colour tenebrous 
For often under a fayre fayned fable 
A trouthe appereth gretely profytable. . 10
p
Bundy, pp. 537, 538. 
^Bundy, p. 539. 
^^Bundy, p. 539.
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Hawes explaines that if a poet is inventive and he does
not apply his fantasy "to the best kind of cunning," his work
will fall short of its purpose. Fantasy (imagination)
exemplifies invention, and causes a writer "With hold
desyre/to brynge it [his work] to an ende. . .
Bundy explains that Hawes is interpreting invention
in terms of the medieval conception of the five inward wits:
"common sense, imagination, fantasy, judgment, memory."
Bundy concludes: "He thus achieved a marriage of rhetoric
and psychology which had important consequences for the
12history of the poetic imagination." And, further, he
states that one is justified in assiming that "inventio
was first explained in terms of mental powers not earlier
13than the beginning of the sixteenth century." Invention 
thus marries poetic inspiration with imagination and fan­
tasy. Imagination for Hawes is "the poet's capacity for 
fiction, resulting in the 'far-feigned fable.
In Bundy's evaluation, Ronsard completes the marr­
iage of invention and imagination. He quotes from Ronsard's 
treatise on poetry: "Invention is nothing else but the
natural good of an imagination, conceiving the ideas and
^^Bundy, p. 540. 
12Bundy, p. 540. 
^^Bundy, p. 541. 
^^Bundy, p. 541.
forms of everything that can be imagined, heavenly as well 
as earthly. . . .
Bundy's most effective examples, however, are George 
Puttenham and Sir Philip Sidney. (I have taken the liberty 
of adding to Bundy's examples from these works.) Puttenhairfs 
treatise. The Art of English Poesie, published in 1589, is 
one of the first to ascribe dignity to the aesthetics of 
the English language. He places the powers of the poet 
among the divine powers given to man by His Creator. He 
interprets God as Creator in a slightly different manner 
than the Platonists, because he asserts that God did not 
create the world out of a pre-existing Idea, as the Platonists 
claim, but out of nothing. Even so, "The poet makes and 
contrives out of his owne braine both the verse and matter 
of his poem and not by any foreign example. Such a view 
confers a sublime dignity upon the powers of the poet, and 
it makes invention a capacity for originality of thought 
and design. The poet's perfection, says Puttenham, grows by 
some divine instinct.
Puttenham gives poetry a place of divine importance 
in the history of every culture, suggesting that it has 
ever been the first means of giving order to man's exper­
ience. . It predates a culture's consciousness of its own 
history. Contrary to the view that a poet is a
^^Bundy, p. 541.
^^George Puttenham, "The Arte of English Poesie," 
In Elizabethan Critical Essays, II, ed. Gregory Smith 
(London; Oxford, 1904), p. 19.
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"phamtasticall," the poet is the source of creation for all
aspects of a culture ;
For the mind of man, being well affected 
and formed, can be so uniform and well pro­
portioned and clear that by it, as by a 
glass or mirror are represented unto the soul 
all manner of beautiful visions, whereby the 
inventive part of the mind is so much holpen 
as without it no man could devise any new or 
rare thing; and where it is not excellent in 
his kind, there could be no politique cap- 
taine, nor any witty engineer or cunning arti­
ficer, nor yet any law maker or counsellor of 
deep discourse. . . . And this phantasie may 
be resembled to a glasse, as hath bene sayd, 
whereof there by many tempers and manner of 
makings, as the perspectives doe acknowledge.
. . . Even so.it is the phantasticall part 
of man (if it be not disordered) a representer 
of the best, most comely, and beautifull images 
or appearances of things to thg^soul and accord­
ing to their very truth. . . .
Puttenham's inclusion of all creative activity imbues the 
quality of imagination with a significance never articu­
lated by medieval or classical rhetoricians.
Sir Philip Sidney's Apology for Poetry, published 
in 1595, reiterates the poet's divine calling. The poet is 
"the first light-giver to ignorance"; and even the first 
philosophers, notably Plato, depended on poetry as the 
medium of thought. Sidney recalls that the Romans called 
a poet "diviner, foreseer, prophet." The Greeks called a 
poet a "maker." The poet's gift is that faculty of mind 
which allows him to immerse himself in the works of Nature 
cind present them as his own mind sees fit: "Only the poet.
^^Puttenham, pp. 20, 21.
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disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up 
with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect 
another nature, in making things either better than Nature 
bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were 
in Nature. . .
It will readily be seen that, in the defense of 
poetry (creative use of language), the critical writers 
of the English language in the sixteenth century were more 
concerned with the rhetorical device of invention than with 
other rhetorical devices, and they interpreted invention 
as the source of "imagination." Invention allows a poet 
the freedom to make his own design of order and beauty. It 
allows him to participate in the divine nature of God. It 
gives him the ability to "rival" nature with the workings 
of his own mind.
It is the imaginative capacity of the mind which is
most like the quality of mind in meditation. In The Art of
Divine Meditation, Joseph Hall describes a process of the
mind in which reason, which he recognized as the gift of
God, gives way to a faculty of the mind beyond reason. This
faculty he names variously as the "affective" part of man,
"the enkindling of our love to God," "deliberate meditation,"
19"divine opticks." In The Remedy of Profaneness,.he
18Sir Philip Sidney, "An Apology for Poetry," In 
Criticism: The Major Texts, ed. Walter Jackson Bate (New
York: Harcourt, 1952) , p. 97.
^^Hall, p. 335.
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elaborates on "divine opticks," or the ability of man to 
see the invisible God: "There must be an exaltation and a
fortification of our sight, for our visive beams are at 
our best so weak, that they are not able to look upon a 
sight so spiritually g l o r i o u s . T h i s  appears to be a 
description in religious terms of the same capacity of 
mind described in aesthetic terms by sixteenth-century 
English rhetoricians. Hall continues: "There must be a
trajection of the visual beams of the soul, through all 
earthly occurrences, terminating them only in God. When 
this occurs, there will remain a certain divine irradiation 
of the mind. . . .
The irradiation of the mind prepares the mind for 
new insights. This illumination does not render the per- 
ceiver speechless or hypnotized; it produces in the per- 
ceiver the calmness of order and the excitement of new 
discovery. The person meditating becomes capable of 
adding new creations to the realm of knowledge. The 
vision of God is stunning but not blinding; it enables 
the meditator to see the things of this world in new per­
spectives. In religious terms the "irradiation of the 
mind" is the interaction between the mind of man and the 
mind of God; in aesthetic terms this power is the genera­
tive principle for creativity.
2°Hall, p. 335. 
^^Hall, p. 335.
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Hall praises the virtual meditation of God, which 
may occur in man when he is at work or is least suspicious 
of God's presence: "when, by the power of an heavenly
disposition wrought in the mind, we are so affected, as 
that divine thoughts are become the constant, though insen­
sible guests of the soul; while the virtue of that original 
illumination sticks still by us, and is, in a sort, derived 
into all our subsequent cogitations; leaving in them per­
petual remainders of the holy effects of the deeply wrought
22and well grounded apprehension of God."
It is in the context of Hall's description of the
soul's capacity to see God that Browne's statements about
the perceptions of faith must be read: "Me thinkes there
be not impossibilities enough in Religion for an active
faith; the deepest mysteries our containes, have not only
been illustrated, but maintained by syllogisme, and the
rule of reason: I love to lose by selfe in a mystery, to
23pursue my reason to an o altitudol" Browne appears to be 
following the way of meditation prescribed by Hall.
Browne's method begins with mysteries. In the Reliqio, the 
mysteries are the greatest mysteries of the Christian 
religion. Browne pushes his reason to the limits of logic; 
frequently this insistence for knowledge rewards him with 
the "divine irradiation" of the mind— an o altitude, the 
movement of perception beyond reason. Browne is convinced
^^Hall, p. 336. 
23Browne, p. 18.
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that the light of man's reason may only reveal the shadow 
of God; "Where there is an obscurity too deepe for our 
reason, 'tis good to sit down with a description, peri­
phrasis, or adumbration; for by acquainting our reason how 
unable it is to display the visible and obvious effects of 
nature, it becomes more humble and submissive unto the sub­
tilities of faith; and thus I teach my haggard and unre­
claimed reason to stcope unto the lure of faith.
Both Hall and Browne attempt to describe the capacity 
of the mind to perceive Divine matter; it is a mysterious 
and marvelous quality, the gift of God no less than reason. 
But both Hall and Browne are not willing to lose themselves 
completely in a mystery. Both emphasize the cooperation of 
reason and faith, or reason and imagination; and both in­
sist that the purpose of meditation is to produce a new 
ordering of experience, a "new creation" of the mind which 
arranges the perceptions of the heart and the intellect 
into meaningful patterns. Hall instructs that the subject 
matter of meditation be chosen with care "that all distrac­
tions may be avoided, our judgment enlightened, our inven­
tions quickened, our wills rectified, our affections 
whetted to heavnely things, our hearts enlarged to God-ward, 
our devotion enkindled; so that we may find our corruptions 
abated, our graces thriven, our souls and lives every way
24Browne, p. 19
bettered by this exercise." The process of selectivity is 
a very disciplined effort "which is done by an inward 
inquisition made into our heart of what we both do and 
should think upon, rejecting what is unexpedient and un­
profitable. In both which the soul, like unto some noble 
hawk, lets pass the crows and larks, and such other
worthless birds that cross her way, and stoopeth upon a
25fowl of price, worthy of her flight. . . . "
The most remarkable aspect of Hall's prescription of 
a method of meditation is his instruction that the mind 
proceed with extreme orderliness. Even though the percep­
tion of God is received through "a divine irradiation of the 
mind," the resulting meditation is fashioned with a due 
concern for order and propriety: "After which, our medita­
tion must proceed in due order, not troubledly, not pre­
posterously. It begins in the understanding, endeth in the 
affection; it begins in the brain, descends to the heart; 
begins on earth, ascends to heaven; not suddenly, but by
26certain stairs and degrees, till we come to the highest."
Hall's transcription of the "stair of meditation," 
as he had learned it from "a nameless monk," is the heart 
of his essay on meditation. That transcription is as 
follows:
^^Hall, p. 60. 
















What I thinkshould think.
A repelling of what I should not 
think.
necessary.
Of what most expedient.
comely.
An actual thinking upon the matter 
elected.
A redoubled commemoration of the 
same till it be fully known.
A fixed and earnest consideration, 
whereby it is fastened in the mind.
A clearing of the thing considered 
by similitudes.
An extending the thing considered 
to other points, where all questions 
of doubts are discussed.
An estimation of the worth of the 
things thus handled.
A confirmation of the estimation 
thus made.
A sad and serious meditation of 
all the former, till it may work 
upon the affections.
From hence'to the degrees of affection.
Following Hall's transcription of this stair of
meditation as he had received it, he simplifies the scale
28and reinterprets it as follows:
1. Voluntary division of the matter.
2. Causes




5. Appendances and qualities of the subject.
6. Contraries.
7. Comparisons or similitudes.
8. Testimonies of Scripture.
What is extremely significant about Hall's reinterpretation
of the scale of meditation is that it is essentially a
reinterpretation of the classical rhetorical principle of
dispositio. Dispositio in the formal rhetoric of Cicero
was an acutely analytical method of discourse, by which a
subject was divided into arguable points. Sister Miriam
29Joseph describes the basic processes of disposition:
1. Use of testimony and witnesses.
2. Definition.
3. Division: Genus and Species, Whole and Parts.
4. Subject and Adjuncts.
5. Contraries and Contradictories.
6. Similarity and Dissimilarity.
7. Comparison: Greater, Equal, Less
8. Cause and Effect, Antecedent and Consequent.
The question arises as to whether Hall distorted the stages 
of meditation passed down by "a nameless monk," or whether 
the ancient practices of Western meditation coalesced with
the studies of formal logic and rhetoric. Such an
29
See Part II of Joseph's book. Rhetoric in 
Shakespeare's Time (New York: Harcourt), 1947.
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investigation is not pertinent to this study, although the 
temptation exists to suggest that treatises on meditation 
were passed down by the learned clergy, who would have been 
disciplined in the arts of rhetoric, logic, and grammar.
The more relevant question to this study is the way in 
which Hall reinterpreted dispositio for the purpose of 
meditation. He reinterpreted it, essentially, as a process 
of mind in which the reason cooperates with divine illumina­
tion, or the Spirit of God within man, to formulate new 
perceptions of God.
Hall recasts the scale of meditation as a series of 
processes alternating between the "understanding" and the 
"affections." Hall's clarification of this basic alterna­
tion process is extremely significant, because at the same 
time that it draws attention to the two broad divisions of 
the scale of meditation, it illuminates the basic dialectic 
involved in this type of meditation. Meditation begins with 
the mental activities of analysis, division, logical order­
liness; it ends in feeling, or a sense of intuitive grasp 
of the meaning derived from analysis. It begins with the 
processes of abstraction; it ends in personal appropriation 
of concepts, often with the result of discovering personal 
symbols that aid in the intuitive apprehension. It begins 
with the mind's limited attempt to proscribe infinite con­
cepts; it ends with a sense of expansiveness.
Hall's pointed emphasis on the rational understanding 
in the course of meditation seems to diverge from other 
writers' emphases on the intuitive stages of meditation. His 
effort was commendable, because it attempted to isolate the 
processes of a religious practice that has always been 
obscured in mystery. His purpose was to make the practice 
of meditation accessible to everyone, not only those who 
devote their entire lives to religion. His struggle to ana­
lyze the processes of meditation may be comparable to the 
efforts of Sidney and Puttenham to describe the creative 
processes of the poetic mind.
It may be helpful to give a rhetorical interpretation 
of Hall's stages of meditation. He divides Stage One 
("Voluntary division of the matter") into two aspects: "a
serious consideration of the subejct," and "an easy and 
voluntary division of the matter meditated." In rhetorical 
terms, this step is the exordium, or entrance, into the 
subject; it is the selecting, focusing process of limiting 
the scope of consideration. Stages Two and Three are pro­
cesses that work in conjunction with each other; the search 
for causes naturally leads to consideration of effects.
Stage Four, "definition," works in cooperation with 
"appendances or qualities of the subject." Likewise, Stages 
Six and Seven work together; a consideration of "contraries" 
leads to consideration of similitudes.
It is clear that Hall deliberately constructs a 
rather spohisticated form of analytical processes. The 
most obvious characteristic is the use of antithesis by 
the pairing of apparently diverse processes. Such pairing 
produces a continuing dialectic in the course of the medita­
tion, a dialectic that allows pause, synthesis, renewed 
energy for the next stage of the process. But the whole, 
process produces the effect of ever-widening attention to 
the subject and never-ending consciousness of it. In short, 
it is a "stair" of meditation. The process, once begun, 
renews itself constantly by the inner energy exerted in the 
dialectic. The large, overall bipartite structure of the 
whole meditation allows for the larger dialectic of under­
standing and affection working together, or a dynamic inter­
action between the reason and the emotions. It also allows 
for the tension between partial understanding and the 
surrender of reason when the understanding can penetrate no 
more. This dialectic allows for the going out of the indivi­
dual self into the otherness it has the ability to perceive 
and the return to the self for tranquil, restorative, 
eidetic resolution.•
In Hall's interpretation, the meditation does not end 
at white heat; there is no drastic fall from heaven to earth. 
And reason and emotion (or imagination) have an equal harmon­
ious contribution to the meditative process. There does 
remain a sense of ambiguity at the conclusion, partly 
because the primary aim of the meditation has not been
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emergence into new definitive boundaries of the subject 
but emergence into a new satisfactory level of awareness.
For anyone else but the individual meditator, the meditation 
may indeed appear inconclusive, obscure, dark, or mysterious.
Joseph Hall is a significant writer, indicating the 
intricate relationships that exist between the arts of 
rhetoric, logic, aesthetic, and meditation in the seventeenth 
century. His greatest significance, perhaps, is that he 
illustrates the importance which meditation held as the 
means for translating classical theories of rhetoric into 
a viable aesthetic for the seventeenth century. Hall enun­
ciates a theory of mental activity which is similar to the 
aesthetic theories of Sidney and Puttenham. It is signifi­
cant that aestheticians and religious leaders alike were pre­
occupied with the state of mind preceding creative activity. 
Hall retains elements of the classical rhetorical tradition 
of dispositio, but he emphasizes the intense ubjectivity of 
meditation. The result of Hall's combined respect for logic 
and rhetoric and for the unknown powers of subjectivity is 
the practice of an aesthetic that is visible in Sir Thomas 
Browne. Browne respects classical rhetoric, but at the same 
time he escapes the static forms of classical rhetoric to 
allow the uneven movements of his mind to play with inner, 
spiritual realities.
CHAPTER III
THE RELIGIO MEDICI AND 
THE STAIR OF MEDITATION
The Reliqio Medici may be read as a series of medita­
tions, each of which conforms to the structure of the stair 
of meditation which Joseph Hall describes in The Art of 
Divine Meditation. Even the most casual reader of Browne 
cannot help observing the impulse toward piety in his works, 
an impulse perhaps best characterized as an attempt to culti­
vate an inner life of devotion, a kind of contemplation that 
made the various areas of his study form a cohesive whole.
It is almost certain that Browne owed this attitude toward 
his inner life to Hall and other writers of the art of 
meditation. Some readers of Browne de-emphasize the medita­
tional quality of the Reliqio. Perhaps the hesitancy to 
label it confessional or devotional is due to the absence 
of long passages of Browne's direct address to his own soul 
or to God. Absence of petitions, prayers, penitent long­
ings may be due to Browne's own temperament; he was a 
modest man in all respects, unpretentious, in his own words, 
devoid of "the first and father sin, not only of man, but
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of the devil Pride. . . He did not assume authority 
in religious controversies. He was by nature melancholy, 
sober, not given to outbursts of emotions.
The reader of the Religio is struck with Browne's 
descriptions of his silent feelings in religious moments, 
rather than with his verbalizations of his emotions: his
compulsion to pray for a departed friend while watching 
the funeral procession, rather than his prayer; his ten­
dency to bow in devotions rather than expression of the 
devotions themselves; his elevation at the sound of the 
Ave Marie bell, rather than his lyrical outbursts at the 
sound. But there can be no doubt that the Religio is a 
dialogue between the soul of an individual man and the 
God he adores. It is, in the tradition of Bishop Hall, 
a labored attempt to practice the art of devotion by 
exercising the understanding and the will as these are 
directed toward the mysteries of religious faith.
The dialectic of the meditational process allowed 
Browne the freedom to exercise in his prose the surges of 
the mind toward ultimate Reality. Browne's prose exemp­
lifies so well the quality which Morris Croll ascribes 
to Anti-Ciceronian prose. The rhythm and pause of the 
Religio suggest that Browne was more concerned with 
revealing his mind at work than with the polished reso­
lutions of his thought. The dialectic of meditation also 
allowed Browne to be both subject and object, to enter his
^Browne, p. 70,
meditation as the "I" of a man struggling for the recon­
ciliation of reason and faith, and to withdraw from his 
meditation to consider the mystery in question from the 
several perspectives of the scientist, scholar, anti­
quarian. Finally, the dialectic of meditation allowed 
Browne the possibility of exercising the mind in paradox. 
Browne's paradoxes are peculiarly meditational, as they 
are asymmetrical in quality, the antithesis posed being 
unequal, and all contradiction being subsumed in God.
Browne's Religio conforms in its external struc­
ture to the structure of meditation which Hall expounds.
It is divided into two main portions, corresponding to 
the two main divisions of meditation which Hall pre­
scribes; 1) Meditation from the Understanding; and 2) 
Meditation from the Affections. The Religio is concerned 
in its first portion with the attempts of reason to under­
stand the mysteries of the Christian faith; it is concerned 
in the second portion with a meditation on Charity, a 
meditation which leads Browne to utter his most personal, 
emotional thoughts on religion.
In Part I of. the Religio, Hall's stair of medita­
tion may be traced as follows :
Sections 1-10. A method of religious devotion.
Sections 11-22. The Being of God.





The relation of the spiritual world 
to the material world.
Death, the Judgement, Heaven and 
Hell.
Sections 54-60. Christ and salvation.











A taste and relish of the sub­
ject.
A complaint of unfitness.
An hearty wish of the soul for 
what it wants.
An humble confession of the 
soul's disability.
An earnest petition.
A vehement enforcement of our 
petition.
A cheerful confidence of obtaining 
what the sould requests and thanks­
giving.
To illustrate the influence of Hall's method of 
meditation on Browne's Religio, the sections dealing 
with the Being of God conform almost exactly to the 
scale of meditation as it unfolds the "understanding" 
part of the meditative process. Sections 11-22 pro­
ceed by an analysis of the nature of God similar to 
analytical processes in the stair of meditation.
Stage One: A serious consideration of the subject.
In Section 11, Part I, of the Religio, Browne begins his 
consideration of the nature of God. He says, "In my
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solitary and retired imagination I remember I am not 
alone, and therefore forget not to contemplate him and 
his attributes who is ever with me. . . In the
first ten sections of the Religio, Browne has described 
his particular method of devotion; the first serious 
subject of his meditation is the Being of God. Like 
other writers of meditation, Browne considers this 
inquiry as the entrance and necessary prerequisite to 
all other subjects of contemplation. Browne is brief 
and terse in the proposal of this subject of "serious 
consideration," but it is the subject which comprehends 
all other major concepts in the Religio. Browne says 
quite simply that God has not made a creature that can 
comprehend Him in full, because God alone can say I am 
that I am.^  God's self-sufficient nature and man's de­
pendent nature ("I remember I am not alone") are the 
foundational concepts in all of the Religio.
Stage Two. An "easy and voluntary" division of the 
matter meditated. In Section 11, Browne proposes to treat 
of two qualities of God— his wisdom and his eternity. Why 
Browne made this division is not patently clear, but in 
the course of his other meditations, he returns to these 
centripetal points. With the wisdom of God, Browne says 
he "recreates" his understanding, and the meaning is both
2
Browne, pp. 19-20. 
^Browne, p. 20.
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senses of recreational— renewal of his own mind and delight 
in the perception of God’s wisdom. With God’s eternity, 
Browne says he "confounds" his understanding.^
Stage Three. A consideration of the causes. With­
out being presumptuous, Browne attempts to account for the 
cause of God’s Being, and he does it largely in Aristo­
telian terms: "There is but one first cause, and foure
second causes of all things; some are without efficient, 
as God, others without, matter, as Angles, some without 
forme, as the first matter; but every Essence, created 
or uncreated, hath its finall cause, and some positive 
end both of its Essence and operation. . . ."^ Browne 
is careful throughout the Religio to maintain the dis­
tinction between the Being of God as the only uncreated 
substance in the universe and the beings of his creatures.
Stage Four. A consideration of the fruits and 
effects. The effects of God’s wisdom and eternity are 
visible in the whole created order. Browne believes that 
the whole universe is of perfect design from the wisdom 
of God: "There are no Grotesques in nature; nor any
thing framed to fill up empty cantons, and unnecessary 
spaces; in the most imperfect creatures, and such as 
were not preserved in the Arke, but having their seeds 
and principles in the wombe of nature, are every-where 




hand discovered. . . Browne's personal preference
is not for the larger designs of God's created order, 
but for the tiny bits of nature that reflect, rather 
than magnify, the significance of God's creative power.
Stage Five. A consideration of the whereabouts 
of the subject. In Section 15, Browne focuses on the 
revelations of God. He acknowledges Scriptures as the 
most open revelation, but Browne himself prefers the 
more mystical revelation of God within nature. Rather 
unconventionally, he intimates that the heathm might 
have known God better, because they could read the 
letters of nature, unlike Christians, "who cast a more 
careless eye on these common Hieroglyphicks, and dis­
dain to suck Divinity from the flowers of nature."^
Stage Six. Appendances and qualities of the sub­
ject. The "appendances" of the revelation of God are 
elaborated in Section 16; these are the infinite workings 
of the providence of God. Browne calls God's providence 
"that straight and regular line, that setled and constant
course the wisedom of God hath ordained the actions of
8his creatures, according to their severall kinds." 
Knowledge of God proceeds through the working out of God's 
providence in His creation. The "effects of nature" 
are the works of God, and there is nothing irregular or
^Browne, p. 24. 
^Browne, p. 25. 
®Browne, p. 24.
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or ugly in these. Browne says there was never anything 
completely misshapen or deformed but the Chaos, before 
the creative power of God impregnated it.^ In Section 
17 Browne discusses the more secular or common way of 
tracing the providence of God through Fortune or as­
trology. He calls this a "cryptick and involved method 
of his providence," but he does not dismiss its impor­
tance for understanding the workings of God.^® In 
Section 18 he says, "'Tis we that are blind, not fortune," 
because we do not understand that even the chance occur­
rences of human lives are part of the larger design of 
God's providence. Astrology is a negative, but sure, 
acknowledgement of God's providence: "The Romans, that
erected a Temple to Fortune, acknowledged therein, though 
in a blinder way, somewhat of Divinity; for in a wise
19supputation of all thing begin and end in the Almighty."
Stage Seven. A consideration of what is diverse 
or contrary to the subject. In this stage, Browne con­
siders major objections to a belief in God, or the nature 
of atheism. He believes the tendency to atheism is 
first a failure to understand the forces at work in 
man's intellect: "For there is in our soule a kind of 
Triumvirate, or Triple government of three competitors.
^Browne, p. 25. 
^^Browne, p. 26. 




which distract the peace of this our Coiranonwealth, not
lesse than did that other the State of Rome. As Reason
is a rebell unto Faith, so passion unto Reason: As the
propositions of Faith seeme absurd unto Reason, so the
Theorems of Reason unto passion, and both unto Faith. . . ."
A proper balance is possible, and, when achieved, allow
room for a belief in God. Browne insists that there is
no true atheism:
That doctrine of Epicurus, that denied the 
providence of God, was not Atheism, but a 
magnificent and high-strained conceit of 
his Majesty, which hee deemed to sublime to 
minde the triviall actions of those inferior 
creatures: That fatall necessitie of the
Stoickes, is nothing but the immutable law 
of his will. Those that heretofore denied 
the Divinitie of the holy Ghost, have been 
condemned but as Heretickes; and those that 
now deny our Savior, (though more than Here- 
ticks) are not so much as Atheists: for
though they deny two persons in the Trinity, 
they hold as we do, there is but one God.
One cause of atheism is the tendency to dwell on insig­
nificant problems in the Scripture or in the consideration 
of God, such as whether Adam was an hermaphrodite or who 
will rise with Adam's rib at the resurrection. Browne's 
admonition is to refuse to yield to unreasoned beliefs, 
to practice the "libertie of reason." He says, "I confesse
^^Browne, p. 29. 
^^Browne, p. 30. 
^^Browne, p. 31.
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I have perused them all, and can discover nothing that 
may startle a discreet beliefe. . .
Stages Eight, Nine, and Ten— consideration of com­
parisons and similitudes, titles and names of the subject, 
and fit testimonies of Scripture— appear to have been in­
corporated into the preceding stages. For example, in 
explaining the providence of God, Browne compares God 
to "an excellent Artist" and to "askillful Geometrician."^^ 
The providence of God is the art of God that He has so 
contrived that even His obscurest designs are completed.
The providence of God is so perfectly schemed that the 
"forelaid principles" of God's compass are discernible 
in nature. Browne cites few testimonies of Scripture 
except as the use of his reason may make the Scripture 
more believable. For example, in Section 22 he cites 
commonly accepted beliefs which Scripture does not really 
verify— that Methusela was the longest-lived man, or 
that Judas perished by hanging, or that the Tower of 
Babel was erected to prevent another flood. These are 
points of dispute on which the reason of man may work 
without detracting from the validity of Scripture and 
with the end product of making the Scripture more believ­
able. But the bulk of Browne's meditation on God is
^^Browne, p. 31. 
^^Browne, p. 25.
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from the use of his own reason after he has absorbed 
the major concepts of God given in the Scripture.
Thus, Sections 11-22 follow the structure of 
the scale of meditation proposed by Bishop Hall in The 
Art of Divine Meditation. The other major areas of 
contemplation in the Religio follow this same pattern.
If they do not adhere to it rigidly, they nonetheless 
follow the general design set forth by Hall. The con­
clusion of one major subject of meditation leads na­
turally, almost imperceptibly, to the other. Meditation 
on the Being of God leads to meditation on Scripture 
and miracles; that leads to meditation on the relation 
between the spiritual world and the material; that leads 
to a consideration of death, heaven, and hell; that 
leads to meditation on Christ and salvation; that leads 
to meditation on the greatest Christian virtue. Charity. 
The whole effect is of a vast linked chain, in which 
the subjects of meditation join each other, in due and 
proper course. If there is a logic that unites these 
subjects and urges one meditation to the next, it is the 
logic employed by the soul as its attention is directed 
from the object of contemplation, God, to the soul's 
readiness or worthiness to contemplate God. There is 
always an unfinished quality to each meditation, although 
there is always a satisfactory pause. The Religio pushes 
relentlessly from one subject of contemplation to the
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other, almost in digressive fashion, as if one subject 
simply prodded Browne to think of another as an after­
thought. But in light of the structure of meditation, 
which is really a kind of rhetoric, the loose, linked 
quality only confirms that, to Browne, contemplation on 
the mysteries of God proceeds by a stair, or scale, of 
meditation.
According to Hall's treatise on meditation, the 
practice is divided into two major activities— those 
directed toward an understanding of the subject and 
those directed toward the affective appropriation of 
the subject. The eleventh stage listed in the scale 
of meditation which Hall reproduces is termed "Rumi­
nation," or "A sad and serious meditation of all the 
former, till it may work upon the a f f e c t i o n s . H a l l  
takes this stage as comprising the whole part of the 
second major activity of meditation, "Affection." This 
stage unfolds yet another scale. The first part of the 
Affection stage is "a taste and relish of what we have 
thought upon." This part is presumably the resting stage 
of the meditative process in which the mind feels at ease; 
it is also the stage in which personal feelings assimi­
late the concepts and attitudes shaped in the first part 
of the meditative process, that part in which the under­
standing, or reason, gave form to the subject. Hall says.
^^Hall, p. 70.
"We cannot know aright, but we must needs be .affected.
Let the heart, therefore, first conceive and feel in 
itself the sweetness or bitterness of the matter medi­
tated; which is never done without some passion, nor
18expressed without some hearty exclamation."
■ The second part of the Religio is remarkably 
different in temper from the first part. It deals with 
only one subject. Charity, the virtue which Browne con­
sidered the most desirable personal virtue that issued 
from the Christian religion. In this part of the Religio, 
Browne is noticeably more personal and reflective. He is 
not so much concerned with the knotty problems of the 
Christian faith as he is concerned with the effect that 
the major concepts of Christianity have on individual, 
personal behavior. The result of meditations on the 
Being of God, the nature of man, the nature of the created 
order, Christ and salvation— all the theological enigmas 
with which Browne struggled in Part I— find a resolution 
in the personal virtue of Charity. In broader terms,
God's wisdom and eternity are incomplete without his 
love and man's response to it.
The external structure of Part II of the Religio 
conforms to the scale of meditation for the second major 
division of meditation according to Bishop Hall. Sections 
1 and 2 correspond to Stage One, "A taste and relish of
l^Hall, p. 73.
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the subject." Browne says quite simply that faith in 
God is only a concept without the virtue of Charity. All 
the "wingy mysteries" that make faith rich and absorbing 
are incomplete without personal virtue. In these two 
sections, Browne reveals more about his own individual 
habits of virtue. He says he was disposed to charity 
by his childhood and parents and by his own temperament: 
"For I am of a constitution so generall, that it consorts 
and sympathizeth with all things; I have no antipathy, 
or rather Idiosyncrasie, in dyet, humour, ayre, any thing. 
He is not disturbed by differences in climate, customs, 
food, eccentricities. He feels no malice toward those 
of different race or nationality. He is at home anywhere: 
"In briefe, I am averse from nothing, (neither Plant, 
Animall, nor Spirit); my conscience would give mee the 
lie if I should say I absolutely detest or hate any essence 
but the Devill, or so at least abhorre any thing but 
that wee might come to composition."^® But, Browne con­
tinues, being disposed to Charity is not enough. He that 
is kind and generous may respond out of the passion of a 
moment and not out of a reasoned belief in the virtue of 
charity.
In Sections 3 and 4, Browne offers a kind of com­




in any aspect of his life, especially in that part which 
constitutes his vocation as a scholar; "I intend no 
Monopoly, but a Community in learning; I study not for 
my own sake onely, but for theirs that study not for 
themselves. I envy no man that knowes more than my selfe; 
but pity them that know l e s s e . H e  is not contentious 
nor condemnatory: "I cannot fall out or contemne a man
for an errour, or conceive why a difference in opinion 
should divide an affection. . . . "  He is not given to 
point out the weaknesses of whole peoples, for the vices 
of people are necessary for virtues to flourish: "They
that endeavour to abolish vice destroy also vertue, for 
contraries, though they destroy one another, are yet the 
life of one another." Again, "No man can justly censure 
or condenme another, because indeed no man truely knowes 
another." Browne's personal shortcoming, as he sees it, 
is lack of knowledge of himself. He says that his closest 
friends do not really know him; he frequently seems re­
mote or obscure from them: "This I perceive in my selfe,
for I am in the darke to all the world, and my nearest 
friends behold mee but in a cloud; those that know mee 
but superficially, thinke lesse of me than I doe of my 
selfe; those of my neere acquaintance thinke more; God 




onely beholds me. . . ."23 Browne asks, "How can we di­
rect charity towards others, if we are uncharitable to 
ourselves?" He concludes that man is his own worst 
enemy and even "his owne executioner."^^
Sections 5 and 6 correspond to Hall * s third 
stage, "an hearty wish of the soul." In these sections 
Browne admires the mystical relationship that exists 
between two friends: "I never yet cast a true affection
on a Woman, but I have loved my Friend as I do vertue,
25my soule, my God." In the union of souls, Browne per­
ceives a metaphor of God's love: "Omitting all other,
there are three most mysticall unions: Two natures in
one person; three persons in one nature; one soule in 
two bodies.
Stage Four, "An humble confession of our dis­
ability," occurs in Sections 7 and 8. To do no injury 
to any and to love himself as he ought become the para­
lyzing conflict that obstructs charity:
I were unjust unto mine own conscience, if 
I should say I am at variance with any thina 
like my selfe; I finde there are many pieces 
in this one fabricke of man; this frame is 
raised upon a masse of Antipathies; I am one 
mee thinkes, but as the world; wherein not­
withstanding there are a swarme of distinct
23Browne, p. 77. 
Z^Browne, p. 77. 
^^Browne, p. 78. 
^^Browne, p. 78.
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essences, and in them another world of con­
trarieties; wee carry private and domesticke 
enemies within, publike and more hostile ad­
versaries without. The Devill, that did but 
buffet Saint Paul, playes mee thinkes at 
sharpe with me: Let mee be nothing if within
the compassé of my selfe I doe not find the 
battell of Lepanto, passion against reason, 
reason against faith, faith against the 
Devill, and my conscience against all.
In section 8, Browne professes that he has escaped the
father sin of all, pride. He enumerates his acomplish-
ments— understanding the jargon and patois of several
provinces and knowing no less than six languages,
travelling in several countries and becoming acquainted
with their customs, knowing the names of stars, plants,
being familiar with the major philosophies of the world-
but he is unperturbed that he does not know everything.
Stage Five, "An earnest petition," may be found
in Sections 9 and 10. Browne believes the soul to be
"Harmonicall" and a reflection of the harmony of the
spheres. He desires harmony and wholesomeness in the
world: "I desire everything in its proper season, that
neither men nor the times bee out of temper. Le me bee
sicke my selfe, if sometimes the malady of my patient
be not a disease unto me. . . ."28 gig conversation is
the same with all men. He belives no man bad and the
worst man the best. But all these desires for goodness
^^Browne, p. 80. 
2 8Browne, p. 85.
do not deflect his fears that he needs to be delivered 
not from other men but from himself.
Sections 11 and 12 conform to Stage Six, "A vehe­
ment enforcement of our petition." Browne's concentration 
in this segment is on the transitional state of man; if 
he is to be delivered from himself, it is because he (and 
all men are) is made in the image of God. The present 
world is but a pause in the final destination of man:
"For the world, I count it not an Inne, but an Hospitall,
29and a place, not to live, but to die in." To be deliv­
ered from himself is to be delivered from this present 
earth. The mass of materiality in the universe shrinks 
in significance when compared to the magnitude of a man's 
soul: "The earth is a point not onely in respect of the
heavens above us, but of that heavenly and celestiall 
part within us: that masse of flesh that circumscribes
me, limits not ray mind; that surface that tells the 
heavens it hath an end, cannot persuade me I have any;
I take my circle to be above three hundred and sixty; 
though the number of the Arke do measure my body, it com- 
prehendeth not my minde."^0
Sections 13 and 14 correspond to Stage Seven, "A 
cheerful confidence of obtaining our request." In these 




beginning of Part II that Charity is the second half of
the knowledge of God. If knowledge of God's wisdom and
eternity nourishes the understanding of man. Charity
nourishes the will of man in order that he may respond
to the power and will of God. Charity is another way of
describing God: "For this I thinke charity, to love God
for himselfe, and our neighbor for G o d . T o  love is
to recognize one's existence in God: "All that is truely
amiable is God, or as it were a divided piece of him,
32that retains a reflex or shadow of himselfe." Loving 
God and his creatures is another way of penetrating the 
invisible world, which to Browne, is more real than the 
visible world.
Section 15 is the conclusion to part II of the 
Religio and the conclusion to Browne's whole meditation. 
Browne's "thanksgiving" is moderate: like the writer of
Ecclesiastes, he finds little substance under the sun 
and therefore little happiness; but where God is, is 
happiness. Browne's gratitude is included in the com­
mendation of his soul to God: "Blesse mee. in this life
with but the peace of my conscience, command of my affec­
tions, the love of thy selfe and my dearest friends, and 
I shall be happy enough to pity Caesar. These are 0 Lord 
the humble desires of my most reasonable ambition and all
S^Browne, p. 92. 
32Browne, p. 92.
84
I dare call happinesse on earth: wherein I set no rule
or limit to thy hand or providence. Dispose of me accor­
ding to the wisedom of thy pleasure. Thy will bee done,
33though in my owne undoing."
The external form of the stair of meditation may 
be traced in every argument of the Religio, but this 
perceptible form is not enough to demonstrate the strength 
of the dialectic produced by the stair of meditation. It 
is necessary, however, to recognize that the form of the 
Religio is not so haphazard as it may appear at first 
reading. If the Religio is read as a series of medita­
tions, the sudden bursts of insight, preceded by somewhat 
less exciting discussions, are more intelligible. The 
real power of the form of meditation lies in the evident 
struggle in Browne's mind between logic and faith, and 
that struggle produces an elasticity of perception which 
appears to dissolve the arguments of the Religio. The 
struggle of mind which Browne portrays is an uncomfortable 
but, quite paradoxically, very comforting activity.
CHAPTER IV 
IMAGINATION IN THE RELIGIO MEDICI
The structures of the scale of meditation offered to 
Browne a genre or mode for his own contemplations.  ^ Browne 
may not be so easily categorized, however. The stair of 
meditation provided an external form as a kind of discipline 
for Browne's thoughts, but Browne often escaped the confin­
ing nature of any form. The elusive structure of the 
Religio Medici becomes more comprehensible when it is per­
ceived as a stair of meditation in the manner in which 
Joseph Hall describes. The external form of the Religio 
conforms unmistakeably to the formal design suggested by 
Hall for the art of meditation. To confine the Religio, 
however, to the exact stages of the scale of meditation 
would be only to partially understand the significance of 
meditational writing for Browne. Browne has never been
For a different kind of study of the influence of 
meditational writing on Browne, see Anne Drury Hall, 
"Epistle, Meditation, and Sir Thomas Browne's Religio 
Medici," PMLA, 94 (March, 1979), 234-246. This study of 
Browne also connects the writings of Hall with the Religio, 
but the emphasis is on the familiar genre of the epistle 
which evokes piety in a gentle, personal manner. The arti­
cle quite accurately assesses the importance of meditation 
for placing Browne in a tradition.
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easily categorized, and his conceptual design, as well as
the individual tropes of his rhetoric, changes shape even
while it is being perceived in a meaningful pattern. Joan
Webber calls this quality of Browne's writing his trompe 
2
1'oeil effect. Even the most discernible pattern in 
Browne shifts before one's eyes, because Browne seemed to 
delight in imbuing any mode of writing with potentialities 
that even the most skilled of writers had missed.
Beyond the influence of formal design and meaningful 
structure, which provided Browne with the tradition of writ­
ing that he needed, which encouraged the dialectic of his 
thought processes, and to which his art yielded itself with 
ease. The influence of rhetorical patterns within medita­
tional writing is unmistakeable in Browne. These are varied, 
and range from the sense of self that Browne portrays in the 
Religio, the dialogical nature of this work, the uses of 
rhetoric for synthetic effect, and most importantly, the 
uses of language for relational purposes— the use of lan­
guage to draw the reader into relationship with the writer 
and with the world he creates and the use of language to 
show the essential telatedness of matter and form, symbol 
and reality, the writer and the ever-moving shape of con­
cepts, abstractions and their embodiments in human beings. 
Browne's imagination is a synthetic imagination. He con­
stantly invites the reader to draw relationships. And
2
Joan Webber, The Eloquent "I," (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 112.
active participation in the world of Browne's creation is 
a celebration of the essential Unity of all things.
The Religio Medici is a dialogue. Although it is 
not as sharply defined a dialogue as Augustine's Confessions, 
the feeling of dialogue is generated in a number of ways. 
Joan Webber's distinction between the persona of the 
Religio and the individual "I" which is Sir Thomas Browne 
suggests the dialogical nature of the work.^ She argues 
that the "I" in the Religio is almost always a cosmic 
personality, one man speaking for all of mankind, an indiv­
idual who uses the concept of man as a microcosm to make 
personal the thoughts of seventeenth century men in general. 
An instance is Browne's comment on marriage, in which he 
expresses disgust for the sex act and the desire that men 
could propagate like trees.^ She points out that the writer 
of the passage did marry soon thereafter and had twelve 
children. And it was not a question of one individual's 
changing his mind, because the Religio was edited and pub­
lished long after Browne's marriage. The point is that 
Browne's comment on marriage was necessary for the stance 
he was taking on the purity of the union of love between 
two friends.^
^Webber, pp. 121-125. 
^Webber, p. 122. 
^Webber, p. 122.
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Another example of Browne's "I" as created persona 
is in his stated conviction, on numerous occasions through­
out the Religio, that man's soul is immortal and that man 
as he exists on earth is but a transitional being whose 
death will be his entrance into an eternal existence with 
God. In Section 9, Part II, Browne reiterates Plato's 
belief that the soul is in epitome the harmony of the 
spheres: "I will not say with Plato, the Soule is an
Harmony, but harmonicall, and hath its neerest sympathy 
xinto musicke. . . . In Section 11, Part II, he says, 
"There is surely a peece of Divinity in us, something that 
was before the Elements, and owes no homage unto the Sun. 
Nature tells me I am the Image of God, as well as Scripture; 
he that understands not thus much, hath not his introduction
7
or first lesson, and is yet to begin the Alphabet of man."
In Section 34, Part I, Browne crystallizes this concept in 
his famous metaphor of man as an amphibian: "Thus is man
that great and true Amphibium, whose nature is disposed to 
live not onely like other creatures in divers elements, 
but in divided and distinguished worlds; for though there 
bee but one world to sense, there are two to reason; the
p
visible, the other invisible. . . . "  Original though 
Browne's cast is, his conviction is essentially that of the





majority of Christians in the seventeenth century. Thus, 
his "I" on these occasions is not so much a subjective 
point of view as it is the expression of one man speaking 
for all men.
In contrast with this persona are the occasional 
lapses in which Browne does speak with a great deal of 
subjectivity. In Section 36, Part I, Browne allows the 
voice of his own doubt to speak when, convinced of the 
immortal nature of man by his faith, he confesses that as 
an anatomist, he has never been able to locate the source 
of the soul in the body: "For in the braine, which wee
tearme the seate of reason, there is not anything of moment 
more than I can discover in the cranie of a beast. . . . "  
His conclusion of this section, which is also the conclu­
sion of his meditation on the nature of man, he simply
9
observes, "Thus we are men, and we know not how. . . . "
The ambiguity which this subjectivity presents is discon­
certing in the light of Browne's repeated affirmations of 
the immortality of man's soul.
Thus, throughout the Religio, there is a kind of 
dialogue suggested by the alternation of the "I" of 
Browne's created persona and the "I" of his historical 
identity. The result is not damaging to the texture of 
the whole, but rather confirms Browne's perception of man 




God's eternity. Joan Webber comments: "The sense of
time's discontinuity (and hence of man's), so common in 
the age, is constantly present in Browne's thought and 
style. But sometimes he is able to see beyond this condi­
tion simply by imagining eternity, and the God of eternity, 
to whom human time is less than a m o m e n t . O f  Browne's 
persona, she says, "The persona, then, is a trompe l 'oeil 
partly because 'Browne' is both changeable and changeless. 
This basic fact only opens the way to the patterned ambigu­
ities of that temporal timeless 'I '."^^
The active working of Browne's own reason provides 
another kind of dialogue in the Religio, because there is 
the constant sense of Browne's interaction with the learned 
authorities whom he mentions. Browne's stance is such that 
it is almost as if he is arguing in the bodily presence of 
those whom he cites. His differences with Catholics he 
mentions in Section 3, Part I. He refers to Catholics 
obliquely, never calling them by name, but referring to 
those Catholics who pose occasions of dissension for 
Anglicans as "they" or them." Browne assumes for the moment 
the position of orator speaking to a group of Anglicans, 
and his separation of "their" cause and "our" cause lends 
a feeling of "presentness" to his discussion:
^^Webber, p. 125. 
l^Webber, p. 125.
Yet have I not so shaken hands with those 
desperate Resolutions, who had rather ven­
ture at large their decaied bottome, then 
bring her in to be new trim'd in the dock; 
and had rather promiscuously retaine all, 
then abridge any, and obstinately be what 
they are then what they have been, as to 
stand in di^geter and swords point with 
them. . . .
The physical act of shaking hands or standing at sword- 
point with them reinforces his position of bringing these 
Catholics into the actual presence of the reader. He 
continues:
We have reformed from them, not against them, 
for omitting those improperation and termes 
of scurrility betwixt us, which onely differ­
ence our affections, and not our cause, there 
is between us one common name and appellation, 
one faith, and necessary^^ody of principles 
common to us both. . . .
Browne's conciliatory remarks that follow give the sense of
dialogue not only with the Catholics or the Anglicans but
in a very real sense with the reader. He says he has
never been scrupulous about entering Catholic churches;
he has never objected to their ceremonies; even if he hasn't
believed their dogma, he has allowed it. Then,
abruptly, as if he is making an aside to his audience, he
makes a disarmingly honest, bare confession: "I am, I
confesse, naturally inclined to that, which misguided
zeale termes supersition; my common conversation I do
acknowledge austere, my behavior full of rigour, sometimes
not without morosity; yet at my devotion I love to use the
12Browne, p. 12.
13Browne, p. 12.
civility of my knee, my hat, and hand, with all those out­
ward and sensible motions, which may expresse, or promote 
my invisible d e v o t i o n . B r o w n e ' s  stance is a dramatic 
one, in that he presented an "I" for at least three audiences 
that he addresses, and the sense of dialogue is quite clear.
In Section 21, Part I, he mentions a "Doctor in 
Physick of Italy, who could not perfectly believe the 
immortality of the soule, because Galen seemed to make a 
doubt thereof." Another man who professed atheism because 
of three lines of Seneca was a French divine with whom 
Browne was acquainted in France. These men Browne uses 
as examples of those whose religious belief is shaken be­
cause of insignificant distractions. Browne's personal 
knowledge of these men lends vitality to Browne's argument 
that there really are no atoms in divinity; but more than 
that, his description of his own dispute with them allows 
him to assume a very personal stance and confess some of 
the details that have come to him personally in disputes 
about God or the Scriptures. He says, "I confesse there 
are in Scripture stories that doe exceed the fables of 
Poets, and to a captious Reader sound like Garagantua or 
Bevis. . . . "  His stance, again, is that of the actor in 
a drama who stops the drama for an aside.
Browne's mention of learned writers of the past 
gives the effect of bringing them into a dialogue with him.
^^Browne, p. 3é.
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His praise of Scripture is mainly from the point of view 
of a humanist scholar than a Christian; and he says, "Were 
I a Pagan, I should not refraine the Lecture of it; and 
cannot but commend the judgment of Ptolemy, that thought 
not his library compleate without it. . . In Section
14, Part i, Browne first states his belief that God as the 
First Cause may be discerned in the secondary causes of 
his works. He says, "Therefore sometimes, and in some 
things, there appeares to mee as much divinity in Galen 
his Books De usu partium, as in Suarex Metaphysicks; Had 
Aristotle beene as curious in the enquiry of this cause as 
he was of the other, hee had not left behinde him an im­
perfect piece of Philosophy, but an absolute tract of 
D i v i n i t y . I t  seems as if Browne had actually talked 
with Aristotle— and presumes to make a judgment on him, 
not to Aristotle's discredit but for Aristotle's instruc­
tion! Later, Browne cites Plato's belief that the soul is 
an harmony, and, as if he were present with Plato, modifies 
Plato's belief to say that the soul is not a complete 
harmony, but it is harmonical.
In short, Browne's stances that he assumes in the 
Reliqio are dramatic, and in being so, increase the sense 
of dialogue throughout the work. The principle area, 




the traditional sense in which all meditations are dialogues, 
In most meditations the dialogue of the self with God is 
quite marked, with the one who stands at the center of his 
own meditations looking inward at himself and outward to­
ward God, in alternate sequences. With Browne, this dia­
logue is much more complicated. His own direct addresses 
to God are few; yet it is quite clear that the products of 
Browne’s intellect in the Reliqio are directed toward his 
conception of Infinite Intelligence. Perhaps a better way 
of stating the confrontation is to say that the Reliqio is 
the undeniable dialogue of one man's finite consciousness 
with his ideal of eternity. Or, Browne's contemplations 
are alternately directed toward the source of all being, 
his concept of God.
Browne states it several ways: one way is his
metaphor of the "cosmography of the self." The vastness 
of nature, which to Browne is part of the sacredness of 
God's being, is,,in epitome, in the self: "Wee carry with
us the wonders we seeke without us: There is all Africa
and her prodigies in us; we are that bold and adventurous 
piece of nature, which he that studies wisely learnes in 
a compendium, what others labour at in a divided piece and 
endlesse v o l u m e . A n o t h e r  way is Browne's perception of 
the unifying Spirit of the universe as the essential part 
of man: "However, I am sure there is a common Spirit that
playes within us, yet makes no part of us; and that is the
17Browne, p. 42.
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Spirit of God, the fire and scintillation of that noble 
and mighty Essence, which is the life and radicall heat of 
spirits, and those essences that know not the vertue of 
the Sunne; a fire quite contrary to the fire of Hell: This
is that gentle heate that brooded on the waters, and in six 
dayes hatched the world; this is that irradiation that dis­
pells the mists of Hell, the clouds of horrour, feare, 
sorrow, despaire; and preserves the region of the mind in 
serenity; whosoever feels not the warme gale and gentle 
ventilation of this Spirit, (though I feele his pulse) I 
dare not say he lives; for truely without this, to mee
there is no heat under the Tropick; nor any light, though
18I dwelt in the body of the Sunne."
Browne's mystical belief that the Spirit of God is a 
fire and that it is the Essence from which all beings come 
is at the heart of his meditations. If man would know his 
own being, he must find it in this mysterious fire and 
Spirit. And the Spirit of God is in man to the same degree 
that it fills all the rest of existence.
In another paradox, Browne views the Essence of all 
creatures in terms of organism and growth. The invisible 
world, as it suffuses itself into material form contracts 
or shrinks; it becomes as a seed or potential form that 
goes through the process of development. The transformation 
of the visible world into the invisible is an expansion or
18Browne, p. 62.
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dilation of being. For man to truly know himself, he must
see himself and the whole created order from the "eyes" of
God. Browne speaks of the annihilation of the earth:
Now need we fear this term "annihilation", or 
wonder that God will destroy the workes of his 
Creation: for man subsisting, who is, and will
then truely appeare a Microcosme, the world 
cannot bee said to be destroyed. For the eyes 
of God, and perhaps also of our glorified 
selves, shall as really behold and contemplate 
the world in its Epitome or contracted essence, 
as now they doe at large and in its dilated sub­
stance. In the seed of a plant to the eyes of 
God, and to the understanding of man, there 
exists, though in an invisible way, the perfect 
leaves, flowers, and fruit thereof: (for things
that are in posse to the sense, are actually 
existent to the understanding). Thus God beholds 
all things, who contemplates as fully his workes 
in their Epitome, as in their full volume, and 
beheld as amply the whole world in that little 
compendium of the sixth day, as in the scattered 
and dilated pieces of those five before.
Man, who is the microcosm in his earthly existence, will be­
come the Macrocosm after death. Then the material order
will look to the eyes of man as a microcosm.
It is in Browne's attempt to find the nature of the
self that he is directed to the Essence or Being of God. And
thus the Reliqio is a relentless pursuit of the self; it is 
a dialogue of the self with its source of Being. And, as 
is true in all great meditations, the discovery of the self 
is simultaneous with the discovery of Infinite Being.
The rhetorical devices in the Reliqio are part of the 
careful working out of this dialogue of consciousnesses. 
Dialectic and synthesis are most characteristic in this
19Browne, p. 18.
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dialogue. Various dialectical patterns are afforded by the 
structural design of meditation as a scale or ladder of 
mental processes. Apart from the structure of the Reliqio 
as interpreted in Chapter One (above), the Reliqio may be 
seen as a series of tensions that control the work— there 
is the tension between the invisible, spiritual world and 
the visible, material world; there is the tension between 
time and eternity; most pervasive in all of Browne's works 
is the struggle evidenced in the tension between death for 
man and man's immortal nature; there is the tension between 
the wisdom of God and the knowledge of man; and finally, 
there is the tension between nature as the art of God and 
man himself as artist.
Before examining the significance of these para­
doxes, it is necessary to examine the kind of mental pro­
cess which Browne considered himself to be using in the 
Reliqio. Some critics have mentioned the o altitude in
passing, as if Browne got caught up momentarily with a
mystical flash of insight but did not take seriously the
kind of mystical process suggested by this passage. It is
a mistake to take the o altitude passage lightly; for the 
process Browne describes as the particular method of his 
own devotion is precisely the method of inquiry his mind 
pursues.
In "The Art of Divine Meditation," Bishop Hall 
suggests that the primary movement in meditation is from
y»
the understanding to the affections; this apparently simple 
division is full of significance, because it hides within 
it a conflict of opposing mental forces which produce new 
creations. If the movement in meditation is from the 
understanding to the affections, then the key for the whole 
meditative process may be described as the use of reason 
countered with its opposite, the use of "unreason"— what­
ever that might be, perhaps emotion, perhaps imagination, 
perhaps intuition. There is a curious opposition of mental 
forces in meditation: the use of reason or discursive
processes which lead to the point of mystery; at the point 
where mystery begins, reason falls, and that part of the 
mind which, to the mystics, complements reason assumes con­
trol. To many contemplative thinkers, this part of medita­
tion is the activity of the Holy Spirit working upon the 
mind of man. To the practitioners of the art of meditation 
in the seventeenth century, reason and imagination were 
inseparable in the meditative process. The surges of rea­
son were not reprimanded but encouraged by God, only to be 
met by His own Spirit, where, according to the mystics, 
there was a fusion of human and divine knowledge.
It is in this perspective that Browne's own comments 
on the processes of his mind must be seen. The o altitude 
passage is definitive: "I love to lost myselfe in a mystery,
to pursue my Reason to an o altitude." This passage must 
not be seen as casual remark of Browne, a digressive comment.
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The process he describes characterizes the major impulses
of the Reliqio. He says it is his "solitary recreation"
to consider, with his reason, the greatest enigmas of the
Christian religion, and then, with another part of his
mind (unnamed at this point), he loves to answer those
q u e s t i o n s . T h e  questions are not resolved for all time,
but in the restful unrest of the Christian thinker are
resolved in their very uncertainty. Browne says he adheres
to the "odde resolution of Tertullian, Certum est quia
21impossible est." (Certainty is what is impossible.) He
says, "I desire to exercise my faith in the difficultest
points, for to credit ordinary and visible objects is not
22faith, but persuasion." The quality of faith of which 
Browne speaks is no unquestioning acceptance of the articles 
of the Christian religion. It is a dynamic, ever-moving, 
active inquiry into the mysteries of religion. It is the 
curious method of the Christian contemplative, with the 
dialogue in his soul of reason and imagination.
An example of Browne's synthesis of reason and imagin­
ation may be found in part of his discussion of death and 
the nature of man as a transitional creature. Browne dis­
cusses the reality of death as a man of science. He says. 
Section 38, Part I, that he is not insensible of the horrors
^^Browne, p. 18.
21Browne, p. 18.
22Browne, pp. 50, 51.
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of death, "or by raking into the bowels of the deceased, 
continuall sight of Anatomies, Skeletons, or Cadaverous 
reliques, like Vespilloes, or Grave-makers, I am become 
stupid, or have forgot the apprehension of mortality. . . 
Browne's reason clearly tells him this; that if death is 
the end of the existence of man, then certainly it would 
have been better to have never lived. His reason aids him 
in the next step of his thoughts. He hypothesizes that man 
lives in three distinct worlds— the microcosm of the womb, 
the microcosm of the material world, and the last world, 
"that ineffable place of Paul, that proper ubi of spirits." 
And then, in a curious play of his imagination, he posits 
one of his own unique ideas on the transmutation of man's 
being. Upon observation of the life cycle of silkworms, 
he says he has framed "an hermeticall way" for the trans­
formation of man. Man is but "a digestion or a preparative
way into that last and glorious Elixar which lies imprison'd
23in the chaines of flesh. . . . "
Browne approaches apparently unanswerable questions 
with the distinctive method of one who practices the art of 
meditation, the method of holding contraries in the mind at 
once, the method of the understanding working in creative 
tension with the imagination and will. He says, "Since I 
was of understanding to know we know nothing, my reason 
hath beene more pliable to the will of faith; I am now
23Browne, p. 18.
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content to understand a mystery without a rigid definition, 
in an easie and Platonick d e s c r i p t i o n . I n  a statement 
comparable to other contemplatives, he says, "Where I cannot 
satisfie my reason, I love to humour my fancy. . . .
Browne loved a mystery as much as any of his contemporaries. 
The peculiar working of his mind is the movement from reason 
to unreason. He simply will not surrender his search for 
knowledge. Browne's labor is not the forbidden quest for 
knowledge that is too deep for him; it is the struggle of 
Jacob who will not give up until God has blessed him with 
the answer to his question.
Like other contemplatives in the tradition of Bishop 
Hall, Browne was eager to use reason, but not to use it 
proudly as if the human mind were the only source of know­
ledge; he used it as one voice speaking to another voice, 
the voice of uncertainty and obscurity, the voice of God.
In The Remedy of Profaneness, Hall speaks of reason in
almost the same words as Browne when he speaks of "the cap-
26tivation of the understanding to the obedience of faith." 
Hall cites Gerson, a fourteenth-century mystic, who was 
beset with many temptations of doubt, and who, after strug­
gling with doubt, came into "so clear a light of truth and 
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27nothing but confidence and serenity. . . . ” Hall commends
this method of the captivation of the intellect by faith.
But Browne, like Hall, offers the efforts of his
reason as a part of religious devotion. He says, in Section
13 of the Reliqio: "The world was made to be inhabited by
beasts, but studied and contemplated may: 'tis the debt
of our reason wee owe unto God, and the homage we pay for
28not being beasts. . . . "  The Christian's great sacrifice
is "the duty of a devout and learned admiration." These
convictions came out of the tradition of religious writers
like Hall who affirmed that God made all creatures for man,
and God made them for man's reflection, which, if man
29neglects, he is no more than a beast. The brute
creatures see God's world, but without the eyes of spiritual 
understanding which man is capable of.^^
Like Hall, Browne believes that there are three main 
ways of apprehending knowledge: with the eyes of the senses,
as other animals possess, with the eyes of reason, the 
particular earthly reason given to human beings, and with 
the eyes of the spirit, characteristic of angels, percep­




Hall, p. 49. 
3°Hall, p. 50.
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Browne believes that angels and other spirits have "extem­
porary knowledge" and may apprehend immediately with the 
vexation of human reason. Spirits know by instantly perceiv­
ing the essences of forms of things, whereas man must 
deliberate, study, and pursue cause and effect— in a word, 
man must work to understand. The effort to understand 
spiritual realities is aided by the Spirit of God, and thus 
the Spirit of God perfects the reason of man. In "The 
Remedy of Profaneness," Hall expounds at length on the result 
of man's efforts to apprehend things invisible. The efforts
move by the Spirit of God to enable man "both to the faculty
31and exercise of seeing the Invisible." Man's part must in­
volve "a trajection of the visual beams of the soul, through
32all earthly occurrences, terminating them only in God. . . ." 
Browne's remarks on the eye in The Garden of Cyrus probide 
a parallel. He suggests that all things (earthly materials) 
are seen quincuncially, the image in the eye being a decuss­
ation or crossing of the object seen; that is a visual 
trajection of the earthly object to the sense of man. But 
Browne goes further to apply this to the soul of man; 
decussation in the soul of man provides the nexus for the 
corporeal and divine aspects of man, the visible and the 
invisible.
^^Hall, p. 336.
^^Hall, p. 336. 
33Browne, p. 22.
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Hall says that to attain to a pure sight of God, or 
invisible things, there must be "a certain divine irradia­
tion of the mind" in which God illuminates the mind. He 
admonishes: "Let the mind labour to apprehend an intellec­
tual light, which may be so to our understanding as this 
bodily light is to our sense, purely spiritual and tran- 
scendently glorious; and let it desire to wonder at that 
which it can never conceive.
Thus, Browne's o altitude passage is of the greatest 
significance for his own method, particularly in the Reliqio. 
Reason and intuition work together to obtain sight of invisi­
ble things of God. Browne tends to favor reason; but in 
almost all the meditations of the Reliqio, reason is sub­
sumed by other mental processes characteristic of Christian 
contemplatives.
The influence of meditational writers on Browne is 
evidenced in the use he makes of the synthesis of reason 
and imagination, in the structure of meditation as a scale 
or stair, in the very topics he chooses. The rhetoric of 
meditation allows for paradox and antithesis, for the dia­
lectical movement that emerges in the juxtaposition of 
contrary ideas. It tends to produce loosely connected 
patterns and it allows for patterns of intuitional awareness. 
It moves in the form of dialogue. All of these appealed 
to the imagination of Browne.
^^Hall, p. 336.
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To search for the artistry of the Reliqio Medici in 
formal design alone would be to attribute to it a static 
quality which it does not possess, although it is profit­
able to note the striking similarities of structural 
design between the Reliqio and other meditational writings. 
But the artistic nature of the Reliqio can only be satis­
factorily discerned when the reader perceives that formal 
design emerges from the various potentialities that arise 
in Browne's thought, push themselves forward toward develop­
ment, resolve temporarily only to arise again. The Reliqio 
is best described as a series of rhythms, full of constant 
movement, defying any static formalization. Browne was 
thoroughly Aristotelian in his science, and his work with 
generation and reproduction fascinated him more than all his 
scientific research. His own creativity in prose appears 
to be an imitation of his perception of the creative pro­
cess he observed in life forms. Although the invisible 
world of pure form, in the Platonic sense, was the aspira­
tion of his thoughts, Browne, the Aristotelian, delighted 
in the manifestations in material forms of the invisible 
Creator. It is no overstatement to say that the relation­
ship of the material to the spiritual, visible to the invisi­
ble, was the obsession of his life. So, even in the own 
creation of his writing, Browne appears to have recognized 
it as another material form of the spiritual realm, and 
appears to have been pleased to acknowledge his own creativ­
ity as an imitation of God's creativity. His own creation
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occupied space, represented time, grew and developed. And 
although it may seem to "pleasant a trope of Rhetorick" to 
describe his writing, especially the Reliqio, in terms of 
life forms, this metaphor is appropriate. The Reliqio is 
filled with various "seeds" of Browne's imagination. If it 
never quite seems to come to completion, it nevertheless 
gives the sense of development and growth. To press the 
Reliqio towards a "finished" quality is to misunderstand 
its substance : It is the constantly renewed exertion of a
mind directed towards ultimate knowledge. The Reliqio may, 
indeed, be considered the most excellent piece of English 
prose that portrays in art form the most basic of all human 
mental processes— the urgency of the mind's directedness 
toward infinity. The object is not really of major signifi­
cance; the significance lies in the numerous manifestations 
of the mind's directedness.35
35The dialectic of the Reliqio, as I am interpreting 
it, is similar to the dialectic described by Stanley Fish 
in Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1972). Fish argues that the dialectic 
produced between discursive reasoning processes and anti- 
discursive processes risks the loss of the power of reason­
ing altogether in the search for truth. The vehicle of 
dialectic becomes consumed in the process of attaining new 
insights. The good dialectician (seeker of truth) is will­
ing to take the risk, because the discipline produced by 
the dialectic is more important than settled and certain 
"truth"" Fish describes what happens to the reader of the 
Reliqio: "His reason is exercised (and teased) to the
point where its insufficiency becomes self-evident, and 
ratiocination gives way to faith professing assertion; and 
in the process, of course, the working of reason— linguistic, 
logical, rhetorical— becomes the vehicle of its own abandon­
ment. . . ." (p. 353.) Browne's apparently logical distinc­
tions are suggested so that the reader can forget logic. As
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If the Reliqio is considered as a series of medita­
tions, it may well be asked what constitutes the wholeness 
of the Reliqio. why doesn't the progression of impulses 
in thought end in confusion, uncertainty, digressive ineffi­
ciency? The most significant cohesive force is the sense 
of union achieved in the imaginative fusion of unlike forces 
or ideas. This sense of union, reinforced repeatedly through­
out the Religio, describes the superior achievement of 
Browne's imagination. Browne's meditation on the nature of 
God provides both the center and circumference of the whole 
of the Reliqio, becasue it reveals that Browne's passion for 
knowledge is focused on Being. Like most Christian contem­
platives, Browne was content to begin and end his search 
for truth with God, as the First Cause, or Creator of all 
life.
The basic tension in the Reliqio Medici, and, at the 
same time, the basic cohesive force is the audacious quest 
of the mind of finite man for the Being of Infinite God.
Browne makes this juxtaposition clear from time to time. It 
is an uneasy, and at times inharmonious, togetherness. But 
Browne had no intention of portraying himself, or any other 
Christian, as unquestionably comfortable with the knowledge 
of God. Thus, Browne's meditation on the nature of God 
raises some of the most perplexing conflicts of man the seeker
Fish suggests, the reader does not look for new answers to 
the mysteries Browne poses; instead, the reader pauses in 
wonder to observe the process Browne will use to make his 
point, (p. 336)
108
after the divine Mind. One of these conflicts is the paradox 
of the limitations of man's mind as it attempts to under­
stand a Mind without limitations, or a Being that is actually 
incomprehensible for man.
In Section 11, Part I, Browne begins his meditation 
on God with the abruptness of one who confesses the limita­
tions of the human mind: "God hath not made a creature that
can comprehend him, 'tis the priviledge of his owne nature:
I am that I am, was his owne definition unto Moses: and
'twas a short one, to confound mortalitie, that durst ques­
tion God, or aske him what hee was. . . Browne's
perception at this early stage of the meditation on God 
contains the essential understanding of the Being of God, 
without which Browne's other contemplations on being would 
not be valid. God alone is the Being who can say "I am." 
Without this knowledge, Browne's following concepts would 
lose their vitality and meaning. From this base, Browne is 
able to deduce ideas about all other beings. He emphasizes 
that man is a creature who is never completely alone. Man 
can never assert "I am." Man's existence is contingent upon 
God: "for he onely is, all others have an existence with
dependency. . . ."37 Browne's juxtaposition of man's exist­
ence against the Being of God is at once stark and concise, 
frightening and consoling: "and to speak more narrowly,
there is no such thing as solitude, nor any thing can be 
said to be alone, and by it selfe, but God, who is his owne




circle, and can subsist by himselfe. . . Again, "A
man is never alone, not onely because hee is with himselfe,
and his owne thoughts, but because he is with the devil,
39
who ever consorts with our solitude. . . . "  Browne's
distinction marks a definite distance between the being of 
man and the Being of God— man is other than God but could 
not exist without Him. The distance between the Creator 
and the creature is "infinite and incomprehensible."
This basic tension or antithesis between the being 
of man and the Being of God comprehends all of Browne's 
meditations in the Reliqio. It contains the form and reach 
of Browne's imagination, for Browne's imaginative impulses 
emanate from the creative struggle of the reason of man with 
the mass of uncertainty surrounding man's concept of God.
This imaginative effort manifests itself in specific attempts 
to bring together in a comprehensible union the "contraries" 
that stretch from man's being to God's Being. The effort is 
a constantly renewed one, providing the momentary rush and 
flow and pause of the meditational structure. The effect 
is of movement of thought interrupted by occasional moments 
of synthesis, a rush of energy toward the Infinite, or the 
unknowable, with the necessary interstices of concrete 
apprehension afforded by the union of opposites.
The antitheses in the Reliqio, the opposites that pro­




paradox. The components are vastly unequal. The posing of 
one against the other, as the being of man against the 
Being of God, gives the effect of one greatly overshadow­
ing the other. There is tension, or the conflict of oppo­
sites, but more importantly there is the sense of resolution 
contained within the generation of conflict. In the basic 
conflict of man's finite reason in quest of the Mind of God, 
there is the sense of God's movement toward the mind of man 
in cooperation with man's imagination. The result is one of 
resurgence of energy, encouragement for man's attempts to 
reach God, great variety of the concrete apprehensions of 
God, and a sense of affirmation of man's creativity rather 
than a frustration of the reach outward toward the Infinite. 
In a sense, the search is always incomplete but, at the same 
time, always satisfying.
Within the comprehensive arc of tension between the 
finite, searching mind of man and the Infinite Being of God, 
there exist several major nodal points of conflict, which 
Browne deals with by the method of meditation. One of these 
conflicts involves the traditional Christian concept of man 
made in the image of God. In Section 11, Part II, Browne 
says, "There is surely a peece of Divinity in us, something 
that was before the Elements, and owes no homage unto the 
Sun. Nature tells me I'am the Image of God, as well as 
Scripture. . . . "  If man's being is wholly different from 
the Being of God, the question for Browne seems to be. How
can man be like God but different from Him? How can man 
participate in the nature of God and be a creature wholly 
distinct from God?
Browne begins to resolve the mystery by starting with 
a Renaissance commonplace that man is a little world, or 
microcosm: "That wee are the breath and similitude of God,
it is indisputable, and upon record of hold Scripture, but 
to call our selves a Microcosme, or little world, I thought 
it onely a pleasant trope of Rhetorick, till my neare judg­
ment and second thoughts told me there was a reall truth 
therein. . . Most seventeenth-century readers would
have agreed with both assertions— that man is made in the 
image of God and that man is a microcosm. Browne's originality 
gradually reveals itself as he attempts to reconcile these two 
ideas. He draws from his own scientific experiments and 
his own thoughts. His first explanation suggests that man 
moves through five kinds of existences: "First wee are a
rude masse, and in the ranke of creatures which only are, 
and have a dull kinde of being not yet priviledged with 
life, or preferred to sense or reason; next we live the 
life of plants, the life of animals, the life of men, and 
at last the life of spirits, running on in one mysterious 
nature those five kinds of existences, which comprehend the 
creatures not onely of the world, but of the Universe. . . .
^Psrowne, p. 44.
43srowne, p. 44.
Browne's concern is to try to draw some relationship between 
the nature of man and that of God; he goes beyond the "plea­
sant trope of Rhetorick," which, perhaps, in its most common 
use was an attempt to picture the completeness or perfection 
of man. Browne's object is quite different: he must account
for the weaknesses of man while at the same time attempt to 
show man's kinship to God.
Browne's most memorable comment on the nature of man
is in Section 34, Part I: "Thus is man that great and true
Amphibium, whose nature is disposed to live not onely like
other creatures in divers elements, but in divided and dis-
42tinguished worlds. . . . "  Browne seems at least partially 
satisfied with this conclusion; no one can deny that man 
partakes of the flesh-life of animals, but it is harder to 
justify man's nature as spirit like God. Because of Browne's 
scientific interests, he cannot completely account for the 
disparity between flesh and spirit. He says that God 
created all other beings with the word of his mounth, but 
man was the product of a different kind of creation, one 
that necessitated creation of flesh and creation of spirit 
and union of the two: "But in the frairie of man (as the
text describes it) he played the sensible operator, and 
seemed not so much to create, as make him; when hee had 
separated the materials of other creatures, there conse­
quently resulted a forme and soule, but having raised the
^^Browne, p. 45.
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wals of man, he was driven to a second and harder creation
of a substance like himselfe, an incorruptible and immortall 
43
soule." Browne questions the Augustinian concept of trans­
mission of the soul from Adam because of his own observa­
tions of the copulation of beasts with men. He raises the 
central doubt of this topic by confessing that as an anat­
omist he has never been able to locate the soul in the 
brain of man; "For in the braine, which wee tearme the 
seate of reason, there is not anything of moment more than 
I can discover in the cranie of a beast. . . . Browne
pauses at this stage of the meditation with ambiguity:
45
Thus we are men, and we know not how. . . ."
In another attempt to explain man in the image of God, 
Browne asserts that man lives in three distinct worlds: 
the womb, the world, and the place of spirits. His exper­
iments with silkworms provide another explanation: "Man
seems to bee but a digestion or a preparative way unto that 
last and glorious Elixar which lies imprison'd in the 
chaines of flesh, &c. This metaphor once again tries 
to explain man in terms of change and transformation'.
But the full import of man made in the images of God 
and man described as microcosm likes in Browne's fusion 
of Aristotelian and Christian thought. Here, his posing
^^Browne, p. 45. 
44Browne, p. 46. 
45Browne, p. 47. 
46Browne, p. 55.
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of the conflict seems at its sharpest and the resolution 
seems most conciliatory. Man made in the image of God 
becomes truly a microcosm after death in the presence of 
God. For the idea of man was as a seed in potential in 
the mind of God; it became invested in the material world 
for a short time; after death it becomes fulfilled in its 
nature after the intention of God the Creator. Browne 
cryptically phrases the curious relationship of man the 
microcosm with the material world that appears to consume 
him: "The world that I regard is my selfe; it is the
Microcosme of mine owne frame that I cast mine eye on; for 
the other, I use it but like my Globe, and turne it round 
sometimes for my r e c r e a t i o n . M a n  suddenly looms larger 
than the earth. Browne says, "The earth is a point not 
onely in respect of the heavens above us, but of that 
heavenly and celestiall part within us: that masse of
flesh that circumscribes me, limits not my mind: that sur­
face that tells the heavens it hath an end, cannot perswade 
me I have any; I take my circle to be above three hundred 
and sixty; though the number of the Arke do measure my 
body, it comprehendeth not my minde: whilst I study to
finde how I am a Microcosme or little world, I finde my
48selfe something more than the great." Thus, man is more 




earth. Man made in the image of God and man as a microcosm, 
when fused in an imaginative perception become a mystical 
apprehension of the transverse operations of matter becom­
ing spirit and spirit becoming matter. At the last 
annihilation of the world, materiality will dissolve and 
man will'remain, much greater in his selfhood than the 
whole earth. In Section 50, Part I, Browne says that after 
death, man will truly appear a microcosm, and the earth 
shall appear in its "contracted essence" rather than as it 
appears to man before death "in its dilated substance." 
Browne's mystical belief is that the microcosm of man, a 
manner of speaking about man on earth, is the truest form 
of defining man, because after death, man in spiritual form 
will be more substantial than the total material reality 
that comprises the earth in its present form.
Thus, the various "flashes" of insight, or apprehen­
sions of man made in the image of God, a creature of God 
dependent on Him, but also a creature like God, move through 
the Reliqio like a pulsating rhythm. Each is a valid and 
a sharp image; each is true, according to Browne's percep­
tion. There seems to be a progression of understanding of 
the concept— a gradual ascension of the "stair," so to 
speak, until Browne arrives at what he considers to be the 
ultimate significance of man made in the image of God. Each 
of the images, or ways of considering this concept, is like 
the photographic perspective which moves in all directions
XJ.O
in the attempt to comprehend the whole of the reality of 
the object of consciousness. Each seems to transcend the 
other, and all transcend the moving consciousness of Browne, 
in that each is a "frozen" or concrete manifestation of 
his mental processes. The totality of the reality toward 
which the mind is directed is the ultimate transcendence.
Another tension operating as part of the internal 
structure of the meditations in the Reliqio is the mortal­
ity of man opposed to the immortality of God. Meditations 
on death were perhaps the most prevalent kind of meditation 
in the seventeenth century. If belief in an eternal God 
constituted the stability of the seventeenth century belief, 
the reality of death constituted the reality of their daily 
existence. One of the most comforting of Christian cura­
tives for the painful realization of death was the consola­
tion of life after death. Much Puritan literature was 
devoted to the beautiful imaginations of the reward of faith­
ful Christians in heaven. Some writers concentrated on 
imaginations of the after-life to such an extent that these 
were escapist devices from the real suffering of mortal man.
Browne looks realistically at the mortality of man 
and allows the sharp contrast of man's mortality and God's 
immortality to be imagined simultaneously. He employs 
several methods in drawing the stark lines of contrast. He 
reinterprets another trope of rhetoric, "All flesh is 
grass," in literal, scientific terms: "for all those
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creatures we behold, are but the hearbs of the field, 
digested into flesh in them, or more remotely carnified in 
ourselves."49 But in the process of the apparently scien­
tific explanation, Browne quickly formulates the concept 
into another metaphor, one so remote from human respect­
ability that the concept of man's mortality is seen in its 
most repulsive form. Browne calls men Anthropophagi, or 
cannibals, because they perpetuate the cycle of the trans­
mutation of flesh to dust to grass to flesh again: "Nay
further, we are what we all abhorre. Anthropophagi and 
Cannibals, devourers not onely of men, but of our selves; 
and that not in an allegory but a positive truth; for all 
this masse of flesh which wee behold came in at our mouths:
this frame wee looke upon hath been upon our trenchers;
50
In briefe, we have devoured our selves."
Such a grotesque image would seem to be the final word 
of a scientist who continually observed the processes of 
decay. But in the same passage, Browne affirms another 
transmutation of the human body, a transmutation he has 
never personally seen, but one which harmonizes his con­
templations on the nature of man. He states simply, and with 
as stark a conviction as he proclaimed man a cannibal, that 
the souls of men never know corruption, or never partici­




assertion is as striking as his bold metaphor: "I believe
that the whole frame of a beast doth perish, and is left in 
the same estate after death as before it was materialled 
into life; that the soules of men know neither contrary 
nor corruption; that they subsist beyond the body, and 
outlive death by the priviledge of their proper natures, 
and without a miracle; that the soules of the faithfull, as 
they leave earth, take possession of Heaven. . . ."51 
Another method that Browne employes in bringing 
together the painful reality of death and the concept of 
immortality is the disarming honesty of his own personal 
experiences with death. Perhaps on no other topic of his 
meditations does Browne allow his own individual experi­
ence to surface so readily. He reverses the expected 
response of a scientist and physician by saying that all 
his "raking into the bowels of the deceased" and observation 
of "cadaverous relics" do not daunt his conviction that death 
is not the end of man. He says, rather, that his constant 
contact with death only increases his resolve of courage 
in the event of death.
I finde not any thing therein able to daunt the 
courage of a man, much lesse a well resolved 
Christian. And therefore am not angry at the 
errour of our first parents, or unwilling to 
beare a part of this common fate, and like the 
best of them to dye, that is to cease to breathe, 
to take a farewell of the elements, to be a 
kinde of nothing for a moment, to be within one 




Rather than escape the horrors of death in his meditations 
and think only of the beauties of an after-life, Browne 
permits those very horrors to be a real part of his medita­
tions on the mortality of man, because in Browne's view, 
the experience of death is part of the passage to a new 
stage of man's existence. He says, "I have so abject a 
conceit of this common way of existence [mortal life], 
this retaining to the Sunne and Elements, I cannot think 
this is to be a man, or to live according to the dignities 
of humanity; in expectation of a better, I can with patience 
embrace this life. . . The pains of death are a part
of the wholeness of man's existence, and to appreciate 
that wholeness Browne allows the contrast of death to make 
more vital the concept of life after death.
Browne confesses some very personal attitudes toward 
death. But even though Browne admires the Stoic philoso­
phers, he comes to the conclusion that suicide is not the 
consequence of a fear of death but a fear of life and
"where life is more terrible than death, it is then the
54
truest valor to live. . . For his own individual re­
action to death, Browne confesses that he is not so much 
afraid of it as ashamed of it.^^ And in his observation of 
the fragile nature of the flesh of man, Browne professes
^%rowne, p. 49. 
^^Browne, p. 49. 
^%rowne, p. 49.
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gratitude that we can only die once: "But I that have
examined the parts of man, and know upon what tender fila­
ments that Fabrick hangs, doe wonder that we are not al­
ways so [sick]; and considering the thousand dores that
56
lead to death doe thank my God that we can die but once. " 
Browne draws the paradox of the tension between 
mortality and immortality to its most intense image when 
he insists that death is a comfort rather than a fear; 
that it is an object of man’s gratitude rather than an 
object of contempt. The basis for this conclusion is 
Browne's perception of the being of man as a transitional 
creature. The conclusion of this meditation on death is not 
based solely on Scripture or other authority, but on 
Browne’s own attempt to bring into an harmonious whole his 
concept of man in the whole scheme of his meditation on 
Being. He says that, even though the weakest arm can take 
away human life, not even the strongest arm can take away 
human death. It is only God that can rescue us from 
death. God gave man life, and likewise, he gave man death. 
In Browne's view, death is part of the completion of man’s 
existence as God made him. The circle of man’s being in­
cludes death, but also includes the promise beyond death of 
immortality: "Certainly there is no happinesse within
this circle of flesh, nor is it in the Optics of these eyes 
to behold felicity; the first day of our Jubilee is
Browne, p. 51.
death. . . . Hee forgets that hee can die who complaines 
of misery; wee are in the power of no calamities while 
death is in our owne."57
Thus, the contraries of mortality and immortality in 
the mind of the meditative thinker generate hope and not 
despair, because the concept of immortality subsumes mor­
tality. Mortality, or death, is certain and full of 
horror; but its very awfulness makes the promise of immor­
tality even more sure. Instead of death negating the being 
of man, it only fulfills or makes complete the being of man.
A third major conflict of opposites which Browne 
conceives in one imaginative endeavor is the paradox of 
time versus eternity. The two attributes of God which 
Browne proposes to consider in Section 11, Part I, are God's 
wisdom and his eternity. The mystery of God's Being, for 
Browne, is most perplexing in the concept of eternity. 
"Time," he says, "we may comprehend, 'tis but five days 
elder than our selves . . . but to retire so farre backe 
as to apprehend a beginning, to give such an infinite start 
forward, as to conceive an end in an essence that affirme 
hath neither the one nor the other; it puts my Reason to 
Saint Pauls Sanctuary; my Philosophy dares not say the
C O
Angells can doe it. . . ." The reality of time belongs 




which flow into a thousand yeares, make not to him one 
moment; what to us is to come, to his Eternities is pre­
sent, his whole duration being but one permanent point 
without succession, parts, flux, or d i v i s i o n . " 5 9  The con­
cept of time becomes for man another metaphor for the 
Being of God. Time is the best approximation that man can 
experience of the substance of God. The concept of time 
affords the nearest comprehension man has of the Trinity 
of God. Although we cannot presume there was any priority, 
Browne says, of any part of the Trinity, as we conceive of 
Father and Son and Spirit, nevertheless, our perception of 
time permits the perception of the Triune nature of God. 
Browne was most profound at this point, for he apprehended 
intuitively what modern philosophers have demonstrated in 
formulae, that the perception of time is also the means for 
the perception of space. And, without spatial and temporal 
concepts, we could not begin to perceive God.
Browne commends Aristotle's metaphor of a triangle 
with a square, which Aristotle had used as a metaphor for 
eternity: "I wonder how Aristotle could conceive the
world eternall, or how hee could make good two Eternities: 
his similitude of a Triangle, comprehended in a square, 
doth somewhat illustrate the Trinities of our soules, and 




the metaphor of the visible effects of the world as 
"hierorglyphs" of the Invisible. This aspect of Browne's 
meditative thought might also be described as the anti­
thesis of the visible world and the invisible world. As 
Browne conceives the being of God, His substance holds 
all creation together; God is everything. The conflict 
between the visible world and the invisible is no real 
conflict, because the visible world is a hieroglyphic, 
a metaphor, an indicator of the invisible essence of God. 
But apparent conflicts occur because men do not perceive 
the invisible through the visible. Browne affirms that 
there are no grotesques or monsters in nature. Like 
Jacob Boehme and Bishop Hall, Browne sees every creature 
in nature as a symbol or metaphor of the greater design 
of the invisible world.
Like Boehme and Hall, Browne views nature and 
all its effects as the Art of God. Nature becomes a 
complex and intricate metaphor for the design of the 
essence of God: "Every Essence, created or uncreated,
hath its finall cause, and some positive end both of 
its Essence and operation; This is the cause I grope 
after in the workes of nature, on this hangs the pro­
vidence of God; to raise so beauteous a structure as the 
world and the creatures thereof, was but his Art, but 
their sundry and divided operations, with their pre­
destinated ends, are from the treasury of his wisedom. . .
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Conceive the distinct number of three, not divided nor 
separated by the intellect, but actually comprehended in 
its Unity, and that is a perfect Trinity."^1
Time and space become metaphors for God's own sub­
stance. The "mystical1 way of Pythagoras," or the magic 
of numbers, is a way to God. The natural world, with its 
shapes, materiality, and duration in time, is but a short­
hand glimpse of the Being of God. Contrary to common 
observation, the natural world is not the most substantial 
existence; it is merely an indication of the most substan­
tial existence. In fact, it exists as a show or mirror 
image and is therefore unsubstantial. The only real sub­
stance is perceived in brief glimpses by means of this 
unsubstantial shorthand: "The severe Schooles shall never
laugh me out of the Philosophy of Hermes, that this visible 
World is but a picture of the Invisible, wherein, as in a 
pourtract, things are not truely, but in equivocall shapes, 
and as they counterfeit some more reale substance in that 
invisible fabrick. "62
Browne's concern with changes in the forms of things 
has been noted; although Browne uses the metaphor of the 
philosopher's stone and makes reference to alchmical pro­
cesses, he best expresses the processes of transmutation 




w i s d o m . T h u s ,  time and space, nature and all the cre­
ated order are visible embodiments of God's eternity and 
wisdom.
What appears to occupy space and proceed in motion 
and time is really the eternal point, or as Browne says, 
"that straight and regular line, that setled and con­
stant course the wisedome of God hath ordained the actions 
of his creatures. . . . "  God is both artist and scientist: 
"Now this course of Nature God seldome alters or perverts, 
but like an excellent Artist hath so contrived his worke, 
that the selfe same instrument, without a new creation 
he may effect his obscurest désignés. Quite basic
for Browne was the belief that "all things are artifi- 
ciall, for nature is the Art of God.
Another major antithesis posed by Browne is that 
of the reason of man versus the wisdom of God. Browne 
says, "Wisedom is his [God's] most beauteous attribute. . 
Hee is wise because hee knowes all things; and hee know- 
eth all things because he made them all; but his greatest 
knowledge is in comprehending that he made not, that is 
himselfe. And this is also the greatest knowledge in 
man"66 in a sense, then, God's wisdom and eternity
Browne, p. 23. 
Browne, p. 25. 
Browne, p. 25. 
Browne, p. 21.
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coalesce, for the wisdom of God is unfolded in the great 
public manuscript of his creatures. Browne describes 
the wisdom of God in the particular way of discussing 
the providence of God. In this sense, all of history 
and events of individual lives are a working out of the 
wisdom of God. God's wisdom Browne equates with his 
power. For God, there is no separation of these attri­
butes; God's wisdom is God's will and power.
Browne's discussion of man's reason in relation 
to God's wisdom is perhaps his most labored intellectual 
endeavor in the Religio Kedici. In contrast to the wis­
dom of God, man's reason can never be complete. Man
cannot know himself in full; neither can he know God
in full. Browne suggests that man's happiness consists 
in the recognition of the incompleteness of his knowledge, 
Man's use of reason in the struggle toward the fulfill­
ment of his being is commendable, but man's awareness of 
the limitations of reason is equally important. Of the 
difference between God's wisdom and man's reason, Browne 
says, "I know he [God] is wise in all, wonderfull in what 
we conceive, but far more in what we comprehend not; 
for we behold him but asquint upon reflex or shadow; 
our understanding is dimmer than Moses Eye; we are ig­
norant of the back parts, or lower side of his Divi­
nity. . . ."67 Nevertheless, awareness of limitation
^^Browne, pp. 21-22.
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is no real constriction of man's search for God with 
his intellect. Hence, Browne's continued penetration 
into the mysteries of God bears no taint of shame or 
remorse; "Where there is an obscurity too deepe for 
our reason, 'tis good to sit downe with a description, 
periphrasis, or adumbration; for by acquainting our 
reason how unable it is to display the visible and 
obvious effects of nature, it becomes more humble and 
submissive unto the subtilties of faith. . . .
Browne's meditation of God's mysteries works through 
"adumbration," or abbreviated flashes of insight; 
through periphrasis, circular focusing on the center 
of God's being, content with the perspective that 
approaches nearer complete knowledge. Browne says he 
is not bothered with the idea Lux est umbra Dei, "Light 
is the shadow of God." Paradox, or antithesis, may 
be the most revealing way to the knowledge of God.
What man knows not only reaffirms the completeness 
of God's being, and that, to Browne, is curiously 
pleasurable, not frustrating for man.
The working of man's reason is most profitable 
for understanding the Being of God when it applies it­
self to understanding the creation of God. It is in 
the exertion of man's reason in the respect for the 
creatures of God that man best gives to God "the duty
68 Browne, p. 19.
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of a devout and learned admiration." Man's reason may 
be thwarted by his own lack of curiosity, his own sloth, 
as it were, in attempting to follow the "straight and 
regular line of God" through his creation. Man's reason 
may be affected by doubts, temptation, and the presence 
of evil spirits. Browne confesses himself that his 
own contemplations of God have been hampered by the 
Devil; on one occasion, he says, "Thus the Devill played 
at Chesse with mee, and yeelding a pawne, thought to 
gaine of me, taking advantage of my honest endea­
vours . . . . ^
Man's reason may also be diverted from its proper 
course by the constant tendency of the mind toward divi­
siveness and disintegration of knowledge. Browne 
discourages this use of reason, because, he says, "I 
cannot heare of Atoms in Divinity." It is impossible 
he continues, that doubts and conflicts should not arise; 
but they are all "of an easie possibility, if we con­
ceive a divine concourse or an influence but from the 
little finger of the Almighty."
Man's reason finds its true course when it reflects 
upon God by reflecting upon the ladder, or scale, of God's 
creatures. Browne, like Boehme, Bellarmine, and Hall, 
believed that a right knowledge of the scale of Being 




this conviction through his adamant belief in spirits.
Browne is often cited as a curiosity because of his
belief in witches and guardian angels, and he himself
seems perplexed by his own tendencies toward prayer for
the dead. But within the appearances of these beliefs
is Browne's much more profound belief in a ladder of
Being, a belief so central to his mystical approach
to God that the Religio Medici may be said to revolve
around this belief. Browne's description of the scale
of Being is as follows:
. . . for there is in this Universe a Stairs,
or manifest Scale of creatures, rising not 
disorderly, or in confusion, but with a comely 
method and proportion: betweene creatures of
meere existence and things of life, there is 
a large disproportion of nature; betweene plants 
and animals or creatures of sense, a wider diff­
erence; between them and man, a farre greater: 
and if the proportion hold, betweene m^g and 
Angels there should bee yet a greater.
The whole character and quality of man's knowledge be­
comes defined in this belief of Browne's. Spirits approx­
imate the wisdom of God because they possess the ability
for "extemporary knowledge," or intuitive knowledge.
That is, they know all things instantaneously, without 
obstruction of the obstacles presented by space or time. 
Browne says,
I beleeve they have an extemporary knowledge, 
and upon the first motion of their reason doe 
what we cannot without study or deliberation; 
that they know things by their formes, and
define by specificall differences what we
^^Browne, p. 43.
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describe by accidents and properties; and 
therefore probabilities to us may bee demon­
strations unto them: that they have knowledge
not onely of the specificall, but numerical 
formes of individualls, and understand by what 
reserved difference each single Hypostasis 
(besides the relation to its species) becomes 
its numericall selfe. That as the Soule hath 
a power to move the body it informes, so there's 
Faculty to move any, thoug informe none; ours 
upon restraint of time, place and distance. . . .
The ultimate operation of man's knowledge comes
through his mystical union with Christ:
Before Abraham was, I am, is the saying of 
Christ, yet is it true in some sense if I say 
it if my selfe, for I was not onely before my 
selfe, but Adam, that is, in the Idea of God, 
and the decree of that Synod held from all 
Eternity. And in this sense, I say, the 
world was before the Creation, and at an end 
before it had a beginning; and thus was I dead 
before I was alive; though my grave be England, 
my dying place was Paradise; and Evejmiscarried 
of mee before she conceiv'd of Cain.
Thus, the antithesis of the wisdom of God and the
reason of man leads back, almost in circular fashion, to
the basic antithesis of the Being of God and the being of
man. Browne's most pervasive and most profound theme is
the nature of the relationship between idea and form.
Nature, as the hieroglyphics of God, provides symbolic
information to this mystery. The creature man suggests in
epitome the beauty of God's creative union of matter and
form. The driving impulse of Browne's Religio is the




attempt to know God's being by understanding the relation­
ship between the Ideas of God and their emergence in form. 
The unity of the Religio is an intense one, not easily 
perceptible through the somewhat irregular rhythms of 
Browne's thought, but it is nonetheless a unity character­
istic of the mystic. The intense search for the Being of 
God constitutes the unity of the Religio. To trace the 
mysterious relationship between Being and Becoming, between 
Essence and Matter, between Pure Knowledge and its mani­
festations in space and time— these constitute the Oneness 
of the Religio.
The structure of the Religio is so important to the 
perception of its value as a literary form. The external 
structure conforms quite visibly to a meditative tradition 
common in the seventeenth century, and understandable in 
the whole history of Chirstian meditation. This structure 
is strengthened by the internal workings of the various 
antitheses posed by Browne. But on further inspection, 
the internal tensions, which work in circular fashion, 
or dialectic, are no real antitheses— they are too unequally 
balanced to be real paradoxes. The being of man is not 
really antithetical to the Being of God; mortality is not 
really the enemy of immortality; time is not actually in 
opposition to eternity; and the art of God is not in opposi­
tion to its Creator. The weaker part of each set anti­
theses becomes subsumed by the other, not to be obliterated
or nullified, but to be magnified in its incompleteness 
and to be perfected in the completeness of God. The anti­
theses, then, serve as capsules of the energy of the 
Religio, momentary pauses in the intense rush of Browne's 
thought. Each drives the other onward, with the effect 
of energy frozen temporarily but always rushing outward 
toward infinity.
The rhythm of the Religio is the basic rhythm of one 
man's dialogue with God, and the meditational structure 
allows Browne's Religio to be one of the greatest pieces 
of prose dialogue in English literary history. Because it 
is a dialogue of the soul with God, the Religio affords a 
structure for English prose that did not die with seven­
teenth century prose patterns. It is the structure of 
meditation. It is characterized by the directedness of the 
mind. The object in Browne's case was the Christian God, 
but the object may assume any form. Browne's confession 
will be remembered for the beauty of its devotion to God, 
but it is also a master work of the process of the direct­
edness of the mind towards the unknowable. It remains, 
in its superiority, incomplete— and necessarily so, for 
this is the paradigm of the working of the mind as it 
reaches outward.
The antitheses are perspectives of the mind of finite 
man as it is directed towards the Infinity of God. They 
are all part of the same Reality. And thus, the accomplish­
ment of Browne was to demonstrate superbly that the human
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mind does not work straightforward towards completeness 
but in a series of transcendent perspectives. The anti­
theses Browne poses reveal not the disparateness of 
Reality, but the interrelatedness of all the realities 
which the mind can conceive.
CHAPTER V
URNE BURIALL AND THE GARDEN OF CYRUS:
THE MEDITATIONS COMPLETED
The Religio Medici was written in 1634-35 when 
Browne was just beginning to practice medicine. It was 
written before he married and before he became preoccu­
pied with the establishment of his home and his profession 
in Norwich. He spent much time alone and had the leisure 
to be the reflective person which the Religio depicts. 
Urne Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus were written some 
twenty years later, after Browne's marriage and after 
most of his children were born. These two works, so 
noticeably different in external form and internal unity 
from the patterns of the Religio, seem to express another 
aspect of Browne. If Browne is studied, however, as a 
writer who absorbed meditative processes into his thought, 
these two works are not radically different from the 
Religio. Browne's writings are all of a piece, unified 
not only in subject matter (the nature of man, the nature 
of God, and man's obligations to society), but in the 
process of writing. It is my conviction that the art
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of meditation refined the products of Browne's imagination. 
Urne Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus are the clearest, most 
brilliant products of the contemplative imagination.
In these two works, the dialectical rhythms of 
paradox are subdued, although the element of paradox is 
still present. The persona is inconspicuous if not alto­
gether missing. These writings are controlled, as the 
Religio is not, by a unity and intensity of purpose. Urne 
Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus portray not a mind think­
ing but a mind at ease with the truths already accomplished 
by the struggle of meditation. Browne appears to have 
discovered the value of the struggle for order involved 
in the meditational process. Hall's instruction that 
meditation is nothing more than "a bending of the mind 
upon some subject until our thoughts come to an issue" 
appears to have more relevance for these companion works 
than for the Religio. The most observable difference 
between the processes of the Religio and the latter two 
works is the starting point for the mind's activity. In 
the Religio, Browne begins with the enigmas of the 
Christian faith, the invisible, airy theories of theology. 
The movement of the Religio is the working out of these 
theories in Browne's mind until he comes to a resolution 
of the mysteries. In Urne Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus, 
Browne begins with the vivid images— old urns found in 
a field near Walsingham and the pattern of the quincuncial 
lozenge discernible in the gardens of King Xerxes.
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The Religio portrays a mind in the athletic 
struggle for truth, and the reader is urged along with 
Browne to struggle with the mysteries. In Urne Buriall 
and The Garden of Cyrus, the reader is teased with image 
after image which conforms to the main symbols of the 
urn and the quicunx. In these works, Browne has apparently 
already resolved the mysteries inherent in these symbols, 
and he offers more assistance to the reader as the 
reader struggles for the meaning of these symbols. In 
some ways, these works are more cryptic, because their 
design is similar to a large jigsaw puzzle. Browne appears 
to have the answer from the beginning; the reader is tan­
talized into following Browne's arguments.
The art of meditation, as Joseph Hall describes 
it, demands that the mind begin in abstraction and struggle, 
using the combined aids of man's reason and the divine light 
of God's Spirit, until a sense of order has been reached. 
This type of meditation may be compared to a different 
kind of meditation which begins with sense perceptions 
of physical objects— the fixing of the eyes on the Crü- 
cifix or a beam of light, the concentration of the mind 
on the ringing of a bell, the discipline of mind begun 
with knees on a cold, bare floor. This type of medi­
tation apparently works by allowing physical sensations 
to direct the mind toward transcendence of the earthly 
to the spiritual. The type of meditation most familiar 
to Browne, however, is that type which begins with the
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struggle of the mind in abstraction— it begins in a 
frustration for order, a kind of helplessness which the 
human mind feels when confronted with concepts too com­
plex for immediate comprehension.
This kind of meditation prefers the frustration 
of limits because it assumes that it is impossible to 
represent God, even to the inward mind, with any kind 
of imagery. Hall's directions are pertinent: "We may
not think to see God by any fancied representation. He 
will admit of no image of himself; no, not in thought.
All possibly conceivable ideas and similitudes, as they 
are infinitely too low, so they are clean contrary to 
his spiritual nature and his express charge; and the 
very entertainment of any of them is no other than a 
mental idolatry. . .
The thoughts of God must not begin with the physi­
cal objects familiar to man, nor with the images of these 
within the mind; they must instead begin in the deepest 
recesses of abstraction. One very important effect of 
this kind of meditation for aesthetics is what might be 
termed the "cryptogram effect." The mind is teased with 
a multiplicity of enigmas. It is instructive to note 
how many times Browne uses the words "riddle," "puzzle," 
"enigma," "mystery," "hieroglyph" in the Religio;




"It is a riddle to me"
"The whole Creation is a mystery"
"There are mystically in our faces certain 
characters"
"There are wonders in true affection, it is 
a body of aenigmaes, mysteries, and riddles"
to name a few. The progress of the Religio is Browne's 
confrontation of the great mysteries of the Christian 
faith, one after the other: the nature of miracles,
the divinity of the Scripture, the nature of eternity, 
the Trinity, life after death, existence of spirits, the 
nature of heaven and hell. He raises all these proble­
matic questions with the confidence that "there be not 
impossibilities enough for an active faith." Browne's 
mind is the contemplative mind at work in the meditation 
of abstraction; it is the mind at work in the confron­
tation of limits.
Hall and Browne were not alone in operating by 
these mental processes. Seventeenth-century thinkers 
were fond of the riddle, in the most sophisticated sense 
of the word. They loved to pose enigmas for which there 
was no apparent answer so that the mind could play at 
will with these mysteries. The element of "play" is 
essential in this concept. The mind is teased with the 
very impossibility that appears to inhibit it. Many 
seventeenth-century writers (Hall is a good example) 
envied the angels because they could think day and night, 
without weariness, on matters for which the human mind
139
felt limitation. In The Art of Meditation, he acknow­
ledges the extreme difficulty of the meditative process: 
"Not that we call for a perpetuity of this labour of medi­
tation; human frailty could never bear so great a toil. 
Nothing under heaven is capable of a continual motion 
without complaint; it is enough for the glorified spirits
p
above to be ever thinking and never weary." But he 
admonishes persistence: "Persist til thou hast prevailed;
so that which thou begannest with difficulty shall end 
in comfort."^
This struggle of the mind for order became a mode 
of discovery for Browne the artist. Browne's struggle 
with enigmas usually eventuated in meaningful metaphors 
and symbols. The Religio is dotted with these symbols 
as Browne's flashes of insight pose momentary resolutions 
to the enigma. His struggle to describe the peculiar 
mixture in man of matter and spirit eventuates in the 
famous metaphor of man as "that great and true amphibian," 
caught between the worlds of matter and spirit. His in­
sight into the providence of God eventuates in the beau­
tiful metaphor of God as "a skillful Geometrician." The 
problem of life after death becomes more acceptable to 
the mind with Browne's comparison of man's mortal state 




maturity, much like the transmigration of silkworms. The 
miseries of human life are comprehended in that unsettling 
metaphor of the world "not as an Inne, but a Hospitall," 
for people to die in. The necessity of Christ's inter­
vention for man's salvation is described in a particu­
larly cryptic metaphor: "The world was before the Creation,
and at an end before it had a beginning; and at an end
before it had a beginning; and thus was I dead before I 
was alive; though my grave be England, my dying place 
was Paradise, and Eve miscarried of mee before she con­
ceiv'd of Cain." Of the limited vision of man and the
prospect of a greater existence than earth affords, Browne 
compares the earth to a seed; man will see it as such when 
his vision becomes like that of God.
These cryptic metaphors and symbols, so character­
istic of Browne, may be attrituble to the influence of 
meditation. Browne utilized the artistic potential of 
this struggle of the mind. The meditative thinker is a 
kind of alchemist— a good and wholesome alchemist— who 
transmutes spiritual insight into understandable and 
pleasing symbols. ' The transmutation is largely a matter 
of rearrangement of the materials at man's disposal— the 
physical world, man's perceptions of that world, the 
relationships of man to the rest of the created order.
The rearrangement has infinite possibilities because of 
God's plenitude.
141
The results of this alchemy are the metaphors, 
symbols, paradoxes, and analogies which emanate from the 
mind's frustration for order. In no way does this alchemy 
misrepresent God or His creation, because, for Browne 
(as well as for his audience), there is nothing without 
order but the Chaos, and that is a realm outside the 
presence of God, a realm inaccessible to man because 
man exists in God: "There was never any thing ugly, or
misshapen, but the Chaos; wherein nothwithstanding, to 
speake strictly, there was no deformity, because no 
forme, nor was it yet impregnate by the voyce of God. . . 4
For Browne in particular, this alchemy results in 
the kind of metaphors and symbols which resemble cryp­
tograms, or as Browne might term them, hieroglyphs. The 
hieroglyph, to Browne, was the most powerful kind of 
symbol. It "pictured forth," or represented an orderly 
interpretation of experience, but it retained elements 
of the mystery it represented, so that the hieroglyph 
was incomplete in itself but a clue to the mystery. It 
was, to use one of Browne's favorite expressions, "Janus­
faced." It was concrete, apprehensible, beautiful; it 
was also cryptic, enigmatic, and to some extent, unde­
cipherable .
In Browne's view of the vitality of the whole 
created order, everything is hieroglyphic— weeds, flowers
^Browne, p. 36.
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animals, and man himself.^ The responsibility for in­
terpreting the hieroglyphs of the world lies with man. 
Gordon Keith Chalmers, in "Hieroglyphs and Sir Thomas 
Browne," emphasizes the potency of this conept of symbol 
for B r o w n e .G His article reveals that Browne's concept 
of heiroglyph was a misstaken concept of the Egyptian 
hieroglyph. He points out that Browne thought of Hiero­
glyphs as pictographs and ideographs— a "language of 
things."^ To most of the scholars of Browne's day, 
"Hieroglyphs were enigmas; consequently to all they seemed 
to contain the secreta secretorum. Ancient legend taught 
that the mysterious signs were purposely obscure to the 
uninitiated. Browne believed, Chalmers says, that "the 
hieroglyphs represented the inner origins of things,
g
their intentions and Ideas. . . . "
What appears to fascinate Browne in his later 
writings is the power of man's symbols to draw human 
beings together in an appreciation of the mysteries of 
life. Urne Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus lack the
^Rosemary Freeman, in English Emblem Books (London; 
Chatto and Windus, 1948), suggests that Browne's interest 
in hieroglyphs is related to the seventeenth-century in­
terest in emblem books. While this observation is a valid 
one, I feel that Browne's imagination was more concerned 
with the dialectical processes of logic and rhetoric than 
with visual representation. His fascination for hiero­
glyphs was the interest in this form of compressed meaning,
^Gordon K. Chalmers, "Hieroglyphs and Sir Thomas 




numerous and varied mataphors.of the Religio, but they 
reveal Browne's discovery of the power of one unifying 
symbol. They are "secularized" meditations; gone is the 
obvious concern for religious enigmas. But these two 
works are intensely mystical. Urne Buriall contains the 
quintessence of Browne's thought on the nature of life. 
Being, existence; The Garden of Cyrus contains his most 
profound thought on the germination of life, or ingress 
and egress from the material world.
The main symbol, or hieroglyph, in Urne Buriall 
is the urn. It is the unifying force in the meditation 
and the enigma. It poses the relevant question for Browne 
and answers it at the same time. Unlike the thought pro­
cesses at work in the Religio, the thought processes in 
Urne Buriall move from one concrete image to the other—  
burial customs of Romans and Greeks, containers of the 
dead, minute observations of the contents of urns found 
in a field near Walsingham. The missing persona is the 
symbol of the urn itself, from which Browne can turn in 
any direction, speak from any perspective, in his most 
sophisticated, disinterested fashion. The urn as a symbol 
draws together all the observations of Browne the scien­
tist; the mind of the scientist directs itself to the 
visible phenomena which present problems to be resolved. 
Like a camera, invisible and silent, but reflecting what 
is observable, this persona is situated in an invulner­
able position. The scientist's mind, in its directedness
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toward these visible objects, transcends them to reflect 
upon them. The reader, without realizing it, is prepared 
with Browne's persona to make the value judgments along 
with him concerning life and death, time and eternity.
The urn as symbol-persona unites all the random 
observations of Urne-Buriall. What Browne discovers is 
the power of symbol to evoke responses at the discursive 
level of understanding and, at the same time, to evoke 
responses at a more primitive level (in psychological 
terms, an unconscious level) of awareness. The shape 
of the urn is always in the reader's consciousness. The 
reflections upon burial by water, fire, or inhumation 
come and go through the reader's mind; the persistent 
question in the reader's mind is the significance of the 
urn itself.
What Browne also discovers is the power of symbol 
to engage the reader's mind in his own imaginative activity 
of drawing relationships. The reader struggles to conform 
the symbol of the urn to his own experience and thus par­
ticipates with Browne in formulating meaningful final 
statements about the urn.
There is a different kind of dialectic in Urne 
Buriall, in which the narrative moves in an ever-widening 
circle of comprehension as the symbol of the urn, ever 
present in the reader's mind, is considered "artificially, 
naturally, mystically." Artificially, it represents man's 
best efforts to preserve what he knows as his own being;
"But these are sad and sepulchral Pitchers, which have 
no joyful voices; silently expressing old mortality, the 
ruines of forgotten times, and can only speak with life, 
how long in this corruptible frame, some parts may be 
uncorrupted; yet able to out-last bones long unborn, and 
noblest pyle among us."^ All the burial customs of civi­
lized peoples are attempts to preserve the remnants of 
human life. The burial receptacle symbolizes man's per­
ception of himself, and the urn is a special effort to 
contain what is preservable in man.
Naturally, the urn suggests birth, the shape of 
the body, sleep, death: "But the common form with necks
was a proper figure, making out last bed like our first; 
nor much unlike the Urnes of our Nativity, while we lay 
in the nether part of the Earth, and inward vault of our 
Microsome. " In its attempt to preserve man and remind 
him of life, quite paradoxically it can only remind him 
of death. Even in death, the materiality of man's exis­
tence on earth haunts him: "Dantes Characters are to be
found in sculls as well as faces. . . . Physiognomy out­
lives our selves, .and ends not in our graves.
Mystically, the urn suggests the "salving" of 
man's identity through the immortality of his soul. The 
urn with its blatant reminder of death forces the mind to
^Browne, p. 131. 
^^Browne, p. 148. 
^^Browne, p. 220.
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meditate on Being. This enigma— not the urns found in a 
field near Walsingham— is the real enigma of Urne Buriall. 
The realization of Browne's thought processes comes only 
at the conclusion. Unlike the Religio, in which the 
enigma is presented in its abstract form at the beginning 
of the meditation, the slow realization of the problem 
which Browne is working through dawns on the reader. The 
problem with which Browne's mind is struggling is the 
nature of Being, in an ultimate sense, and the way in 
which human nature is related to Being.
Browne refuses the concept of annihilation: "It
is the heaviest stone that melancholy can throw at a man, 
to tell him he is at the end of his nature; or that there 
is no further state to come, unto which this seemes pro- 
gressionall, and otherwise made in vaine. . . ." The urn, 
in its most literal sense, is a false testimony: "But to
subsist in bones, and be but Pyramidally extant, is a 
fallacy in duration. Vain ashes, which in the oblivion 
of names, persons, times, and sexes, have found unto them­
selves a fruitlesse continuation, and only arise unto late 
posterity, as Emblèmes of mortall vanities. . . ."
The urn, as a reminder of mortality, directs the 
mind to the nature of true Being: "There is nothing 
strictly immortall, but immortality; whatever hath no 
beginning may be confident of no end. All others have 
a dependent being, and within the reach of destruction, 
which is the peculiar of that necessary essence that
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cannot destroy it self. . . .God who can only destroy our 
souls, and hath assured our resurrection, either of our 
bodies or names hath directly promised no duration.”
Typical of Browne, the reassurance needed to counteract 
the coldness of the urns is missing; the urn, hieroglyphic, 
reveals a truth but remains mysterious as to the whole 
truth. God is the only Being; man exists in Him; whether 
or not man lives, here or hereafter, is of God's choosing.
Thus, at the end of Urne Buriall, Browne's dialec­
tic seems to have lost itself in the very struggle it 
presents. The urn is primary ih the reader's mind as an 
image which suggests the answer to the question to the 
nature of human existence. Its shape suggests birth, the 
form of the human body; the bones suggest a continuation 
of human life after death. The whole argument of the Urne 
Buriall seems directed toward Browne's Christian faith of 
life after death. But suddenly, at the conclusion, Browne's 
argument takes a peculiar twist: the urns suggest mor­
tality as much as immortality, and the hope of eternal 
life is only one man's wish.
The Garden, of Cyrus, a companion piece to Urne 
Buriall, is constructed in a similar way. Again, Browne 
utilizes the power of symbol as a persona, as a means of 
appealing to both the discursive and primitive levels of 
awareness simultaneously. The quincunx is presented to 
the reader immediately. Artificially, the quincunx can 
be discerned in gardens (from the Garden of Eden to the
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present day), armies, temples, surgical procedures, houses, 
furniture, chess-boards, and precious stones. The quincunx 
appears to be the most prevalent geometric form in art, 
whether by conscious practice or unconscious imitation. 
Naturally, the quincunx is discernible in seeds, the 
"squameous heads of weeds," trees, leaves, spiders' webs, 
rock formations, "the house of the solitary maggot," the 
testacies of plants. In Browne's enumeration of examples, 
the quincunx becomes an obsessive symbol in the reader's 
mind; it propels the reader to imagine this symbol in vir­
tually every configuration of nature.
Mystically, the quincunx is symbolic of the germinal 
principle of life. For Browne as a scientist, the theories 
of generation absorbed his serious study. He conducted 
thousands of experiments with the tiny duckweed seed, in 
the attempt to determine the exact process of germination. 
But, characteristically of Browne, his science was not 
divorced from his deepest religious beliefs. Mystically, 
the quincunx was the most exact representation to the 
human mind of the entrance of life into materiality.
Browne's poetic expression of the search for the 
formation of life into materiality reminds the reader of 
the mysterious Garden of Adonis in Spenser's Faerie 
Queene in which the whole creative process is viewed 
from the perspective of one who can glimpse the invisible 
world:
All things from thence doe their first being fetch. 
And borrow matter whereof they are made;
Which, whenas forme and feature it does ketch.
Becomes a body, and doth then invade
The state of life out of the griesly shade.
That substaunce is eterne, and bideth so;
Ne when the life decayes and forme does fade.
But chaunged is, and often altred to and froe.
(FQ, III, vii)
Like Spenser, Browne pursued his search for the source of 
life both by reflections on the invisible insemination of 
life by a Divine Source, and by minute study of observable 
phenomena. Browne expresses himself ambiguously about 
the relative importance of each of these dimensions of 
the creative experience. But he was convinced that the 
continuum of Being was ever active, always surging in 
infinite informations of life; and the process of creation, 
begun with God's creation out of nothing, has never ceased. 
To observe this process of creation is to know God in His 
most basic activity; and to know God is to be moved with 
the love that surges from Him in His creative activity.
Gardens provide the first subject of contemplation 
for creative activity, perhaps because they symbolize both 
Nature and Art. They are the best expression of the 
"verdant state” of. God’s creation, and they are the most 
observable attempts at artifice. The basic enigma, for 
Browne, in The Garden of Cyrus, is the creative act of 
life coming into existence. Again, as in Urne Buriall, 
this enigma slowly dawns on the reader. Browne’s answer 
is, once again, ambiguous, as mysterious as the symbol 
of the quincunx. The soul itself takes the form of the
quincunx: "And this also with application unto the soul
of man, which hath a double aspect, one right, whereby 
it beholdeth the body, and objects without; another cir­
cular and reciprocal, whereby it beholdeth it self. The 
circle declaring the motion of the indivisible soul. . . 
the central decussation, the wondrous connexion of the sev- 
rall faculties conjointly in one substance. . . ." The 
harmony of the soul is maintained by the central decus­
sation of the quincunx, uniting the material and the 
spiritual substances of man.
Thus, the work which began with the quincuncial 
lozenge in the garden of Cyrus ends with the nature of 
the soul. In a curious kind of dialectic, Browne reflects 
the symbol of the quincunx from the objects of nature and 
art to the subjectiveness of the self which is considering 
this symbol. The reader becomes aware that the pattern 
of the quincunx may not, in fact, be so readily discernible 
in the objects of nature; the pattern of the quincunx is in 
the eye of the perceiver and, most importantly, in his soul.
Urne Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus portray the 
directedness of the mind toward God through symbols which 
every reader can utilize in an imaginative-religious act 
of comprehension. The digressiveness which characterized 
the Religio is suppressed so that the symbols of imagi­
nation can efficaciously propel the reader toward the 
enigmas of Ultimate Reality. The urn constitutes the 
symbolic grasp of both the mystery and the significance of
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human life; human life is a participation in the grand 
scheme of Being emanating from God, and it is mortal, 
definite, short of the grandeur it can envision. The 
quincuncial lozenge constitutes the symbolic grasp of 
the ingress and egress of all life forms in the vast 
texture of God's Being. It represents the secret but 
discernible pattern of life being born into visible 
reality, but it also suggests the mysterious, unexplain­
able resolution and finality of material forms. Browne 
uses these two symbols to unify the mind's directedness 
toward God. They persist in the narratives as touchstones, 
or mirrors, for the reflections of the self. These sym­
bols are the refinement of those processes of mind most 
discernible in the art of meditation. The discipline of 
the rhetorical processes of the stair of meditation allow 
Browne the expansiveness to refine his perceptions of the 
created order. Browne preferred to meditate on his own 
being and the relation of man to God by way of reflecting 
on God's created order. In Urne Buriall and The Garden of 
Cyrus, Browne's imaginative processes are complete; the 
dialectic of the stair of meditation allows him to come 
to his most comfortable artistic expression.
CONCLUSION
This study of Sir Thomas Browne has sought the 
circumference of Browne's productivity from the center 
of his imagination. His synthetic imagination produced 
a variety of creative endeavors— scientific experiments, 
philosophical treatises, religious apologetics, lyrical 
expressions. Browne's most fascinating quality is the 
imagination which produced such a variety of manifes­
tations. His imagination is at work in his science as 
well as his poetry.
The remarkable aspect of Browne's imagination is 
the self-consciousness of it. Browne's prose reflects 
a delight with the prospect of the capacities of the re­
flective mind. Browne seems aware that he is experimenting 
with mysterious and wonderful powers of the mind. He is 
not afraid to lose himself in a mystery. Such excitement 
about the mind's creative capacities is present, if only 
in subtle ways, in all his writings.
Another way of emphasizing Browne's self-awareness 
is to say that he is not afraid of subjectivity. For one 
who revered classical models with fervor, Browne displays
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an unusual preoccupation with subjective processes. This 
fascination for subjectivity marks Browne as a transitional 
figure in the history of English prose.
Browne would like to retain the classical and med­
ieval belief that poetry and religion have a common divine 
source. Like Sir Philip Sidney, he agrees that the Greek 
and Latin words for "poet" denote a divine calling. Like 
George Puttenham, he believes the poet is a creator in the 
same way that the Christian God is Creator. But Browne 
experiments with his self-consciousness as a writer, or, 
as it may be termed, his subjectivity. Browne prefigures 
contemporary writers in his concern with consciousness.
In a very real sense, Browne was as much concerned as 
contemporary writers with the structures of the mind in 
its interaction with its environment. Browne’s preoccu­
pation with the tenets of the Christian faith, more real 
to him than the "squameous heads of weeds," should not 
lead readers to believe that he was just another moralist.
The Religio does not contribute new theological 
insights nor even new practical ways of‘living by faith. 
Urne Buriall and The Gardens of Cyrus contribute little 
that is new to the knowledge of God or Being. But all 
three of these works present entirely new perspectives 
from which the mind operates. The structures of mind ex­
hibited by Browne’s persona in the Religio reveal the 
discipline of a dialectic that proceeds in a rigorous 
pattern from subject to object, only to keep transcending
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itself to incorporate more perspectives— and more doubts. 
Urne Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus reveal the power of 
this dialectic when it is submerged in vivid symbols. The 
inner-outer discipline is still at work, engaging other 
minds in the constantly transcending perceptions.
I believe the subjectivity of Browne was aided, 
for the most part, by the art of meditation, specifically 
the "stair of meditation." The kind of meditation which 
incorporates the patterns of rhetoric and logic allows for 
a kind of subjectivity most prominent in modern literary 
forms. It is the dialective of discursive reasoning with 
the unconscious powers of the mind. It is the specific 
kind of meditation which allows the discursive mind to 
withdraw from the object of contemplation and allow the 
processes of symbol to give emotional acceptance or re­
jection of the discursive pattern.
Browne is thus a precursor of the "reflective
imagination" as opposed to the "pictorial imagination."
Browne's love for hieroglyphs would seem to cast him with
the lot of seventeenth-century writers and artists who
produced emblem books. But the hieroglyph for Browne
was not pictorial; it was the fusion of rational processes
and emotional responses. It was the dialectic of the inner
/
mind with the données of the reasoning process.
Unlike Dante and Spenser (and perhaps Milton), who 
might be called the chamoions of the pictorial imagination 
Browne is unable to immerse himself completely in the realm
of symbol. His own profession and scientific mind will not 
allow it, just as his audience will not allow it. But 
Browne is not willing that the realm of symbol should 
be discarded for the strictly utilitarian purposes of 
science.
The result for Browne is a curious mixture of 
logic and symbol which would seem unpretentious to Dante 
or Spenser or Milton. It is a happy result, however, not 
only for Browne, but for a modern scientific environment. 
Browne affirms the possibility of symbol for relating 
people to each other through the means of the reflective 
imagination. The structures of thought processes and not 
the evocation of vivid images assumes a tremendous sig­
nificance. What matters is not the satisfaction of 
questions answered or truth contained but the discipline 
of the mind in its search for fresh perspectives to truth. 
If such a struggle should lead to stunning symbols, so 
much the better. If such a struggle should end in ambi­
guity, the search is still worth the while.
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